



Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (RHEL5)

CIS Benchmark Version 1.1

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[CIS RHEL5 Benchmark]

Table of Contents

1 CIS RED HAT ENTERPRISE LINUX 5 BENCHMARK	11
Introduction.....	11
Feedback is welcome	11
Applying CIS Benchmark Recommendations	11
Audience	12
Applicability	12
Precedence of Benchmark-Compliance Audit.....	12
Partitioning Considerations	13
Software Package Removal	14
Backup Key Files.....	14
Executing Actions.....	15
A Root Shell Environment Is Assumed.....	16
Software Package Installation.....	17
Vulnerabilities.....	17
SELinux	18
About Bastille	18
Reboot Required	18
Housekeeping, preparatory to accomplishing the remainder of the Benchmark:	19
Conventions	19
2 PATCHES, PACKAGES AND INITIAL LOCKDOWN	21
2.1 Apply Latest OS Patches	21
2.2 Validate The System Before Making Changes	22
2.3 Configure SSH.....	22
2.4 Enable System Accounting.....	25
3 MINIMIZE XINETD NETWORK SERVICES.....	27
3.1 Disable Standard Services	27
3.1t - Table of xinetd services (usage of these are deprecated)	27
3.2 Configure TCP Wrappers and Firewall to Limit Access	29
3.3 Only Enable telnet, If Absolutely Necessary	31
3.4 Only Enable FTP, If Absolutely Necessary	32
3.5 Only Enable rlogin/rsh/rcp, If Absolutely Necessary	33
3.6 Only Enable TFTP Server, If Absolutely Necessary	34
3.7 Only Enable cyrus-imapd, If Absolutely Necessary.....	35
3.8 Only Enable dovcot, If Absolutely Necessary	35
4 MINIMIZE BOOT SERVICES	37
4t Table of RHEL5 inetd/boot Services.....	37
4.1 Set Daemon umask	40
4.2 Disable xinetd, If Possible	40
4.3 Ensure sendmail is only listening to the localhost, If Possible	41
4.4 Disable GUI Login, If Possible.....	42
4.5 Disable X Font Server, If Possible.....	43
4.6 Disable Standard Boot Services.....	44
4.7 Only Enable SMB (Windows File Sharing) Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	47

4.8 Only Enable NFS Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	48
4.9 Only Enable NFS Client Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	48
4.10 Only Enable NIS Client Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	49
4.11 Only Enable NIS Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	49
4.12 Only Enable RPC Portmap Process, If Absolutely Necessary	50
4.13 Only Enable netfs Script, If Absolutely Necessary	50
4.14 Only Enable Printer Daemon Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	51
4.15 Only Enable Web Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	52
4.16 Only Enable SNMP Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	53
4.17 Only Enable DNS Server Process, If Absolutely Necessary	53
4.18 Only Enable SQL Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary	54
4.19 Only Enable Squid Cache Server, If Absolutely Necessary	55
4.20 Only Enable Kudzu Hardware Detection, If Absolutely Necessary	55
5 SYSTEM NETWORK PARAMETER TUNING.....	57
5.1 Network Parameter Modifications.....	57
5.2 Additional Network Parameter Modifications.....	59
6 LOGGING.....	61
6.1 Capture Messages Sent To syslog AUTHPRIV Facility	61
6.2 Turn On Additional Logging For FTP Daemon	62
6.3 Confirm Permissions On System Log Files.....	63
6.4 Configure syslogd to Send Logs to a Remote LogHost.....	66
7 FILE AND DIRECTORY PERMISSIONS/ACCESS	67
7.1 Add 'nodev' Option To Appropriate Partitions In /etc/fstab	67
7.2 Add 'nosuid' and 'nodev' Option For Removable Media In /etc/fstab.....	68
7.3 Disable User-Mounted Removable File Systems	70
7.4 Verify passwd, shadow, and group File Permissions	71
7.5 Ensure World-Writable Directories Have Their Sticky Bit Set.....	71
7.6 Find Unauthorized World-Writable Files.....	72
7.7 Find Unauthorized SUID/SGID System Executables.....	72
7.8 Find All Unowned Directories and Files	75
7.9 Disable USB Devices	76
8 SYSTEM ACCESS, AUTHENTICATION, AND AUTHORIZATION	79
8.1 Remove .rhosts Support In PAM Configuration Files.....	79
8.2 Create ftpusers Files	80
8.3 Prevent X Server From Listening On Port 6000/tcp.....	81
8.4 Restrict at/cron To Authorized Users	82
8.5 Restrict Permissions On crontab Files	82
8.6 Restrict Root Logins To System Console.....	83
8.7 Set GRUB Password.....	85
8.8 Require Authentication For Single-User Mode	85
8.9 Restrict NFS Client Requests To Privileged Ports	86
8.10 Only Enable syslog To Accept Messages, If Absolutely Necessary	87
9 USER ACCOUNTS AND ENVIRONMENT.....	89
9.1 Block Login of System Accounts	89
9.2 Verify That There Are No Accounts With Empty Password Fields.....	90
9.3 Set Account Expiration Parameters On Active Accounts.....	90
9.4 Verify No Legacy '+' Entries Exist In passwd, shadow, And group Files	91
9.5 No '.' or Group/World-Writable Directory In Root's \$PATH.....	92

9.6 User Home Directories Should Be Mode 0750 or More Restrictive	93
9.7 No User Dot-Files Should Be World-Writable.....	94
9.8 Remove User .netrc Files.....	94
9.9 Set Default umask For Users	95
9.10 Disable Core Dumps.....	97
9.11 Limit Access To The Root Account From su	97
10 WARNING BANNERS.....	101
10.1 Create Warnings For Network And Physical Access Services.....	101
10.2 Create Warnings For GUI-Based Logins.....	103
10.3 Create "authorized only" Banners For vsftpd, proftpd, If Applicable	104
11 MISC ODDS AND ENDS	107
11.1 Configure and enable the auditd and sysstat services, if possible	107
11.2 Verify no duplicate userIDs exist	109
11.3 Force permissions on root's home directory to be 0700	110
11.4 Utilize PAM to Enforce UserID password complexity	110
11.5 Restrict permissions to 0644 on /usr/share/man and /usr/share/doc content	112
11.6 Set permissions on cron scripts known to be executed by cron to be 0600.....	112
11.7 Reboot.....	113
12 ANTI-VIRUS CONSIDERATION	115
13 REMOVE CIS BENCHMARK HARDENING BACKUP FILES	117
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL SECURITY NOTES	119
SN.1 Create Symlinks For Dangerous Files	119
SN.2 Change Default Greeting String For sendmail	119
SN.3 Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection.....	120
SN.4 Additional GRUB Security.....	121
SN.5 Evaluate Packages Associated With Startup Scripts	121
SN.6 Evaluate Every Installed Package.....	122
SN.7 Install and Configure sudo.....	123
SN.8 Lockout Accounts After 3 Failures.....	124
SN.9 Additional Network Parameter Tunings.....	125
SN.10 Remove All Compilers and Assemblers.....	126
SN.11 Verify That No Unauthorized/Duplicate UID 0 Accounts Exists	127
APPENDIX B: FILE BACKUP SCRIPT.....	129
APPENDIX C: CHANGE HISTORY	133
APPENDIX D: REFERENCES.....	134
CREDITS:	137

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1 CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Benchmark

Introduction

Red Hat Enterprise Linux version 5 (RHEL5) is the new server-class release from Red Hat, Inc, that stabilizes SELinux, has been Common Criteria evaluated at EAL4+ and brings further stability and robustness to the enterprise level with this OS. Security hardening remains a vital element to the defense-in-depth approach for all computing elements within the enterprise.. The Center for Internet Security proudly brings the latest consensus-achieved security hardening recommendations in this Benchmark and accompanying scoring tool.

The content and intent of this Benchmark is to drive you, the reader to be more informed in regards to actions necessary for hardening and securing Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems. It is not going to provide non-security hardening information and guidance just for the sake of providing it. Some basics of a particular function might be touched upon, but this is usually for the relevance it directly provides to the security hardening actions at hand.

Feedback is welcome CIS is always interested in receiving information on bugs, detailed error reports as well as specific comments, discussion and even suggestions for improvement. Please forward them to: cis-feedback@cisecurity.org. Include your first/last name and relevant email address. Additionally, a telephone number would be beneficial.

Please enjoy this edition of the Center for Internet Security Benchmark to harden Red Hat Enterprise Linux version 5.

Applying CIS Benchmark Recommendations

Question¹:

After applying all the recommendations in the Benchmark (and due diligence), is my system "secure"?

The answer to this question depends on what is meant by "secure". If you're asking whether following the Benchmark eliminates *all* known security vulnerabilities and renders this system *completely* invulnerable to unauthorized access, then the answer has to be an unequivocal "no".

However, **carefully following the steps in the Benchmark results in a system which is substantially more reliable and secure** than a default install of the given OS and results in a system which is not vulnerable (or not AS vulnerable) to many well-known security holes. At the time of this Benchmark's writing, the Center for Internet Security's consensus-building process resulted in a solid core of security recommendations. These targeted specific, otherwise vulnerable, portions of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system for hardening. The vulnerability discovery process continues without abatement. So, more are likely to exist, even now.

Every day, many systems are compromised (and later used to attack other systems) because the administrators of those machines failed to exercise even "minimum due care" when installing and configuring the system: patches are not kept up to date, dangerous services remain installed, much less left running even though vulnerabilities have been published, etc...

¹ Original question/answer from online CIS Members forum, dated 2006/08/30

Compliance with the Benchmark means the system administrator has executed a regular backup process (which supports disaster recovery), brought the system up to date with patches (system is current) and accomplished the Benchmark recommendations (done the hardening)--AND--continue to actively monitor/manage it, you've done the best possible from a CIS security hardening perspective.

When accomplishing Benchmark compliance, CIS recommends a log be kept. This could be a paper trail of notes regarding actions taken and results along the way. A better option would be a terminal window (or windows) with very large numbers of scroll back history where all the actions are accomplished and errors are visible.

Audience

This document is intended for Information System Security Officer (ISSO) and System Administrative (SA) types of folks. Additionally, it should be studied and applied by anyone responsible for installing, maintaining and/or configuring servers operating Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5. In the context of this document, an administrative user is defined as someone who will create and manage user accounts and groups, manage controls for how the operating system performs access control, understands how to set account policies and user rights, is familiar with auditing and real audit logs, and can configure other similar system-related functionality.

Applicability

This Benchmark was developed and tested on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) version 5.0 (the initial release). It is likely to work for subsequent Red Hat Enterprise Linux distributions -- and probably other Red Hat, Fedora and CENTOS derivatives -- as well (just simply hasn't been tested against them, yet). The scoring tool may not execute or may yield inaccurate results on non-RHEL systems.

The CIS Benchmark has been tested and verified on Intel/AMD 32. Specifically it has not been vetted against the Intel 64 bit, Itanium and the various IBM architectures.

Precedence of Benchmark-Compliance Audit

A Benchmark 'audit' is a method to check if an item has been secured. The following precedence was used in developing this Benchmark, it will guide implementer's in their application, and will demonstrate how the CIS-CAT scoring tool will score/evaluate a system being reviewed.

- ◆ Determine if an applicable service or application is installed. When ...
 - **True** - Process other relevant audit/checks, even if the service/app is disabled
 - **False** - All other related checks automatically PASS (it is not an error for the service to not exist)
- ◆ Service and applications only require hardening if installed
- ◆ All other audit/checks proceed in sequential order, from the top of the document to the bottom

For any specific CIS Benchmark recommendation where this precedence must be over-ridden, such will be clearly stated for that check. This might affect the implementation of the hardening actions, and will also guide exactly how the CIS-CAT scoring tool will assess the system. This provides stability and consistency across the network, within individual systems, and for those implementing it.

Partitioning Considerations

Before installing the Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system plan out (to the greatest extent possible) a security-minded partitioning scheme.

Note: Neither partitioning, nor implementation of quotas, are scored by CIS-CAT due to their inherent complexity and diversity, while still complying with the intent of this Benchmark.

It is important to keep `/var` and possibly `/home` (if necessary) on their own partitions. Some applications have a tendency to crash when the `/` or `/usr` filesystem reaches 100%. This could happen if users were to store considerable amounts of data (developers storing JAVA jar files or copies of application logs, for example) or system logs were to fill up their partition. Some enterprises define a `/logs`-based partition and direct all application logs there. Such variations are encouraged, especially to better control the availability (uptime) of a system.

`/home` should be its own distinct partition, but then only when this system is employed as a home server for local system or enterprise users, otherwise it should simply be an empty directory, since it will then be a mount point (via `automount`) for mounting the central repository of enterprise users. So, for a system that only has personnel who perform system administrative tasks (i.e. access root commands via `sudo`), no `/home` partition is necessary. For systems that do require local non-administrative users, or is the enterprise server distributing home directories to other servers, then a distinct `/home` partition is the secure way to accomplish this.

Note: To further limit the inconveniences caused by filling up `/home`, consider implementing user and group `quotas` on the `/home` filesystem (i.e. on those servers that are repositories for users and their home directories). `Quotas` will limit how much a single user (or single group) can store on a given filesystem. Application of `quotas` is also not scored by CIS-CAT.

It is preferable to have the `audit` data stored on its own partition so that `auditd` can correctly calculate when its out of space. For example, any user can loop the logger program in a script and fill up `/var` with messages to `syslogd`. But, the overall strategy is to apply security concepts to OS partitioning during installation in such a way that mount options can be applied to secure the machine - e.g. `noexec` options for `/tmp` and `/home`.

Recommend manually changing the `/var/tmp` directory to be a symbolic link to `/tmp`. This will prevent hardlinks to databases and executables possibly held in `/var` somewhere. This can be accomplished with:

```
rm -rf /var/tmp
ln -s /tmp /var/tmp
```

Red Hat does not recommend putting things in non-standard locations, since SELinux already has a notion of where things belong; otherwise run `semanage` to adjust file contents.

Balanced by the guidance provided below, the CIS Benchmark recommends system disk partitioning similar to what is found in the following table:

```
{df -h}
```

Filesystem	Size	Original Allot.	Used	Avail	Use%	Mounted on
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol100	15G	(15360)	367M	14G	3%	/
/dev/sdal	84M	(86)	13M	67M	17%	/boot
tmpfs	292M		0	292M	0%	/dev/shm
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol101	3.9G	(4096)	137M	3.6G	4%	/home
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol102	3.9G	(4096)	137M	3.6G	4%	/opt
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol103	13G	(12800)	160M	12G	2%	/tmp
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol104	7.8G	(8192)	5.3G	2.2G	72%	/usr
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol105	7.8G	(8192)	266M	7.1G	4%	/var
/dev/mapper/VolGroup00-LogVol106	16G	(16384)	173M	15G	2%	/var/log/audit

Note: The "*Original Allot.*" column shows partitioning sizes entered during system installation.

More information is available from the online websites:

http://www.redhat.com/docs/manuals/enterprise/RHEL-5-manual/Deployment_Guide-en-US/ch-disk-quotas.html
<http://h20331.www2.hp.com/enterprise/downloads/RHEL5-CC-EAL4-HP-Configuration-Guide.pdf>
<http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/os-ltc-security/index.html?ca=drs->

Software Package Removal

There has been considerable debate over the disposition of unused software packages. Some people feel that as long as the software is not being used, leaving it installed poses no appreciable risk. Others feel that unused software presents another attack vector and increases the maintenance effort for the administrators. This Benchmark currently makes no recommendation for the removal of *specific* unused software. This Benchmark does encourage a healthy review of installed packages, with an emphasis towards removing those that are clearly not required to support mission applications.

Note: When vulnerable software is present on a system, that vulnerability may be exploitable by a local attacker, and the reader is advised to consider the effort in either its removal or maintenance and the security risks thereof. For example, a service might be unused, disabled (via `chkconfig`)---yet it might also have SUID/SGID executables or scripts that could be used by a miscreant for attacks. This Benchmark recommends carefully evaluating what packages are installed and removing as many of those known to not have a bearing on the functionality of the mission system. Where possible, evaluate this minimization technique on a laboratory system. The rpm commands provide access to the internal documentation of installed packages.

Backup Key Files

Before performing the steps of this Benchmark on a production system it is **strongly recommended** that administrators make backup copies of critical configuration files that may get modified by various Benchmark items. If this step is not performed, then the site may have no reasonable back-out strategy for reversing system modifications made as a result of this document. The critical file protection script, provided in Appendix B of this document will automatically back up all files that may be modified by accomplishing the Benchmark actions below.

Note: An executable copy of the backup script is also provided in the archive containing the PDF version of this document and the CIS scoring tool. Assuming the administrator is in the directory where the archive has been unpacked, the command to execute the backup script would be:

```
./do-backup.sh
```

One of the byproducts of the `do-backup.sh` script is a dynamic system-specific restoration script: `"/root/cis/do-restore.sh"`, which is generated based on the results of the `do-backup.sh` script.

To roll back the changes made by this Benchmark, run `do-restore.sh` with a subsequent reboot, and all changes will be backed out. Since Linux installations are not all identical, the `do-restore.sh` script is created based on the files that actually existed at the time `do-backup.sh` was run, to include preservation of their original permissions.

Once the Benchmark items have been planned for a particular system, it is wise to fully test on a lab duplicate the backup and restoration process and the resultant system operation.

Note: When making changes manually to any of the files that were preserved by `do-backup.sh`, those changes will be lost when `do-restore.sh` is executed. It would be prudent to delete (or save an offline copy of) the `do-restore.sh` script (and specific to the system it came from) once all changes have been validated to prevent inadvertently undoing the changes. The recommended CIS Benchmark backup script is generic, the restoration script is dynamically generated and unique.

Executing Actions

The actions listed in this document are written with the assumption that they will be executed in the order presented, and especially should be evaluated on a test/lab system representing a like-production system first. Some actions may need to be modified if the order is changed, as all possibilities and combinations cannot be anticipated nor exhaustively tested. Remediation has been written so that the scriptlets may be copied directly from this document into a root shell window with a "cut-and-paste" type of operation.

It is possible for some of the `chkconfig` actions, which activate or deactivate services, produce the message: `"error reading information on service <svc>: No such file or directory"`. These messages are quite normal and are not a cause for alarm – they simply indicate the program or service being referenced was not installed on the machine being hardened. As Red Hat Enterprise Linux installs allow a great deal of flexibility in what software is chosen to be installed (as well as behind-the-scenes resolution of dependencies), these messages occur at times while accomplishing some Benchmark compliance tasks; and are normal.

Note: **A strong word of caution is necessary here.** Many of the Benchmark scriptlets **assume** *specific* content within configuration files, *specific* file locations, etc... They are good *enough* for demonstrating to a system administrator what should be addressed, and perhaps good enough to execute against clean/virgin systems. However, some scriptlets are downright **DANGEROUS** to run on a system with changed configuration files, that have evolved as the system is used and administered, without otherwise testing them first!

A relevant, non-trivial, example is the scriptlet within Section 2.3 "Configure SSH". At one point it removes all `"Host *"` lines. This potentially changes the semantics of the configuration file on an operational production system, if the removed entry was preceded by a different, and yet valid, `"Host"` header (or more). This is but one example, even within this section, but by no means the only one.

So, the prudent precaution is to perform CIS Benchmark actions on a duplicate of a production system, not the production system itself! Carefully examine all before and after files for the changes made, and incorporate 'fixes' beyond what the Benchmark can anticipate, to ensure the system is still functioning correctly. Test resulting changed files, configurations and functionality for proper, assured and consistent behavior. Subsequently, migrate stable security hardening, tempered by lessons learned, to production system(s).

Finally, no single change or application of a single section from this Benchmark will fully harden a system. In fact, the bulk of these recommendations are necessary as a whole, though, of course, tailored to the specific environment and role/function of the system itself.

A Root Shell Environment Is Assumed

The actions listed in this document are written with the assumption that they will be executed by an Administrative person logged into the system as the `root` user, running the bash shell and with `noclobber` unset (`set +o noclobber`). Also, the following directories are assumed to be in root's path while accomplishing the CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark hardening/compliance.

Use "`echo $path`" to determine what the current path is set to.

```
/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
```

There is the concept of 'an' established place whereby the CIS Benchmark is executed from, and potentially any hardening actions are operated from. This is established, for consistency as:

```
cishome='/root/cis'; export cishome
```

Where two or more lines to are shown in the remediation area to execute, system administrators are encouraged to carefully collect and run them from a separate shell script rather than individually pasting them directly in an ssh session or terminal to the shell. There can be inadvertent and unresolved line wrapping, line termination, and quoting issues with the latter. To make a shell script, do the following in creating a file with a favorite editor, such as:

```
vi /root/myscript.sh
```

Put this as the very first line in the `/root/myscript.sh` file:

```
#!/bin/bash
```

Paste the commands to run from the Benchmark into the file (ensure the entire script'let for the applicable sections are copied intact). A method to accomplish this would be to have the Benchmark PDF file open in one window, with an xterm window open beside it. Then simply cut and paste sections of script from the Benchmark directly onto the test/development/lab system.

For those lines of script ending in a backslash ("`\`"), make sure that is the last character on the line within the script. The line feed <enter key> must immediately follow it, with no trailing spaces or tabs.

Note: When pasting from Windows or a Macintosh, be careful to ensure the final file has a Unix style of line break; a single LF (Line Feed, ASCII 0x10). Files edited on Windows will commonly have a CR (Carriage Return, 0x13) followed by LF (Line Feed, 0x15). This causes odd errors, including shell scripts that do not run; the typical "Command not found" error occurs because it appears to Unix that the script asked for a shell of "`#!/bin/bash^M`", not "`#!/bin/bash`".

To prevent this from happening, execute the following:

```
tr -d "\015" < /root/myscript.sh > /root/myscriptNEW.sh  
mv /root/myscriptNEW.sh /root/myscript.sh
```

{Another alternative would be to use "`unix2dos`"; check the [man](#) page}

Once the script has been saved, make it executable with:

```
chmod 0700 /root/myscript.sh
```

As necessary, ensure root ownership with:

```
chown root:root /root/myscript.sh
```

Finally, though beneficial when using the bash shell (it isn't required) unalias the `mv` and `cp` commands, as some Unix commands during Benchmark hardening will overwrite files; and might be prompted numerous times about overwriting these files:

```
unalias mv cp
```

Software Package Installation

Throughout this Benchmark, a system administrator may be directed to enable software package init scripts using the `chkconfig` command. This assumes the system administrator has already installed said package(s), and if they are required to satisfy the mission of the particular system.

If the `chkconfig` command fails, verify the installed software is actually required (`rpm -qa <package name>`). The `chkconfig` command enables or disables service initialization at the next reboot, whereas the `service` command affects a service now.

Note: Though `chkconfig` and `service` are complimentary in function, they employ unique options and arguments in managing services.

Vulnerabilities

Every service within the OS has the potential of being an entry point into a system if (when?) a vulnerability is found. This is why CIS Benchmarks recommend that unneeded services are disabled/removed even though there might currently be no clear way to exploit them, and there has never been a problem with the service (an ounce of prevention...). When running an unnecessary service, additional risks exist of a vulnerability being discovered and/or exploited in that service in the future.

Taking this mindset a step further... Careful thought and consideration should be given to application of the CIS Benchmarks across the various systems employed in any given enterprise. Consider the role of the system, number of administrators and/or users accessing it and automated processes operating on it. Fewer services should be installed, much less executing, on systems directly accessible to the Internet. As opposed to systems physically isolated to a test lab environment which is logically and physically isolated.

Where possible, install and maintain systems with a logical consistency, employ an appropriate level of configuration management, leverage stable backup technology, etc. The point here is that this Benchmark is focused on solid RHEL hardening, while it is the end users responsibility to balance the appropriate level of hardening across the enterprise by role and function.

SELinux

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 makes SELinux available during installation. CIS highly recommends to enable this during system installation by selecting "ENFORCING MODE". This setting is helpful to overall system hardening, as it employs the existing protection profiles rolled within this release and activates them for dynamic use during system operation. Again, testing this in a lab environment is recommended in combination with mission applications to validate expected functionality.

With this initial release of the RHEL5 Benchmark, that is as far as SELinux is going to be covered. CIS has plans to develop and release an appendix update to this RHEL5 Benchmark which addresses SELinux in comprehensive detail. The concern is that for this Benchmark many of the scriptlets create new versions of configuration files and then move them into place where the original had been. Many of these files have specific SELinux contexts which get destroyed by running the hardening scriptlet.

- One area to be included in this future section is addressing the restoration of the SELinux 'context' for files this Benchmark modifies. The following scriptlet illustrates the point, though it is not empirically incorporated throughout the Benchmark.

```
if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
    restorecon -v ${file}
fi
```
- Address the appropriateness of `touch /.autorelabel`; etc, etc...

About Bastille

Previous editions of this CIS Benchmark recommended, made use of and/or complimented a system hardened with Bastille by Jay Beale. Bastille is a non-vendor approved (i.e. Red Hat) method of automating and hardening some actions to the operating system, though the currently published version (3.0.9-1) does not natively execute very well against RHEL5. This edition of the CIS RHEL5 Benchmark focuses exclusively on standardized consensus-based application of security hardening to the operating system without reference to Bastille. To be clear, Bastille is an excellent product which can be applied to an RHEL5 system.

It has been recommended to continue to include Bastille in a revised edition to this Benchmark. User feedback and comments are welcome.

Reboot Required

Rebooting the system is required after completing all of the actions specified within the Benchmark in order to complete the re-configuration of the system. In many cases, the changes made in the steps below will not take effect until this reboot is performed. If substantial operating system updates are performed after the initial OS load, the system administrator may have to reboot more than once. Check the SELinux paragraph above and the reboot section (at 11.8) for additional information on relabeling and reconfiguration needed to support SELinux security contexts when SELinux is installed and employed.

Housekeeping, preparatory to accomplishing the remainder of the Benchmark:

As a matter of consistency, this procedure presumes a subdirectory under `/tmp` gets created with secure permissions to temporarily hold work-in-progress files. This temporary directory is to be removed at the end of the Benchmark-compliant hardening process. It is established as follows:

```
mkdir      /tmp/cis
chown 0:0  /tmp/cis
chmod 0700 /tmp/cis
```

Conventions

The following typographical conventions are used in this document:

Roman font (12pt)	normal text
<i>Courier</i> (12pt)	used to indicate a UNIX command, standard parameter, filename, ...
<i>Roman font italics</i> (12pt)	a question the system administrator must evaluate before continuing

This Benchmark has been written in compliance with the CIS Benchmark Formatting Guide, dated June 22nd, 2007.

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2 Patches, Packages and Initial Lockdown

2.1 Apply Latest OS Patches

Description:

Developing a standard procedure for keeping up-to-date with vendor patches is critical for the security and reliability of the system. Vendors issue operating system updates when they become aware of security vulnerabilities and other serious functionality issues, but it is up to their customers to actually download and install these patches.

When Red Hat publishes an update, they include with it the procedures for updating the packages. This usually entails downloading the new RPMs from Red Hat, and making them available to the individual servers. Some Enterprises make these packages available over a Red Hat Satellite server, an NFS share or an internal anonymous FTP/HTTP server – the Enterprise may follow this practice or do something entirely unique/different.

Red Hat offers at least partially automated internet patch download and installation, via Red Hat [yum](#). In lieu of an existing local Enterprise Standard, consider installing [yum](#) and using it on a regular schedule, and whenever Red Hat announces a vulnerability. If the local Enterprise has several servers, consider installing a Red Hat Satellite Update Server that can locally be used in place of Red Hat's Internet yum servers – the updates will go much faster, use much less bandwidth from the ISP, and will reduce the load on Red Hat's servers. When [yum](#) is used locally, it should be used on a lab server and the patches validated and the system regression tested before going to live/production systems.

Some RPMs may need to be installed before others. For the most part, RPM understands and resolves dependencies during the system build phase. Red Hat creates separate instructions for special cases, like the replacement of the kernel or the general C library glibc. Examine the list of updates to check for any of these cases.

There is some risk to using a non-patched, non-hardened machine to download the patches, as this involves connecting a system with unresolved security vulnerabilities on an Internet-connected network, which is not in conformance with Industry Best Practices. Please consider these issues carefully.

It is also important to observe that the mission applications work properly after patching. Though problems in patches are quite rare in Red Hat Enterprise Linux, it is generally recommended that any patch be deployed to a non-production system first for testing. Once it passes testing, then apply it to the production system(s).

The Center for Internet Security and Red Hat specifically encourages system owners, to the greatest extent possible, to upgrade/migrate systems to the latest release of the OS. It will contain all the merged/updated packages.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Update this system per local enterprise update procedures. When connected to the Internet, do:
[yum update](#)

One other viable remediation step would be to incorporate frequent automatic execution of `yum`, via `cron`, with an entry like the following:

```
<minute> <hour> * * * /usr/sbin/rhn_check > /dev/null 2>&1 \  
                && /usr/bin/yum -y update > /dev/null 2>&1
```

Replace the `<hour>` and `<minute>` entries with times that are appropriate for the system.

Additional and/or separate procedures may be necessary to patch/update the system from a local Red Hat Satellite server, or some other method.

Scoring Status: Not Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

2.2 Validate The System Before Making Changes

Description:

Ensuring the system is functioning properly before making a change is a prudent system administration best practice and will save hours of aggravation. Applying this Benchmark to a system that already has issues makes troubleshooting very difficult and may incorrectly indicate the Benchmark is at fault.

Examine the system and application logs (`/var/log`). Key words to look for include, but are not limited to, "error", "warning", "critical", and "alert".

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
cd /var/log  
egrep -i "(crit|alert|error|warn)" * | less
```

Resolve all issues before continuing.

Scoring Status: Not Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

2.3 Configure SSH

Description:

OpenSSH is a popular free distribution of the industry standard SSH protocols which has become the best-practice implementation on Linux distributions. For more information on OpenSSH, see <http://www.openssh.org>.

The settings in this section ensure safe defaults for both the ssh client and the ssh server. Specifically, both the ssh client and the sshd server are configured to use only SSH protocol 2, as long-standing serious security vulnerabilities have been found in the first SSH protocol. This may cause compatibility issues at sites still using the vulnerable SSH protocol 1; these sites should endeavor to configure all systems to use only SSH protocol 2 and migrate away from SSH protocol 1.

The hardening below is divided into changes applicable to the use client for SSH (the first one) and then the SSH Daemon server. The options to `ssh` that are hardened here, are done so as to explain their various options. Please read the man pages, a wealth of internet resources, and Reference AN, as identified in Appendix D.

Client SSH:

- **Host;** Begins a section, so multiple sections can exist. This indicates a *host specification*, identifying what host or hosts the following options are applicable to when initiating ssh communications.
- **Protocol;** The older protocol version 1 (one) has significant well-known vulnerabilities and available exploits, therefore it is not to be used. "2" (two) is a more recent version of the ssh protocol and is more robust and safer to use. Whereas version 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the security of the communications connection.
- **Port;** A default of '22' is recommended, but can be migrated to any otherwise unused port.
- **PubkeyAuthentication;** Public Key Authentication is stronger than password based. It is the recommended default. It requires the establishment and exchange of public and private key pairs.

Server SSH:

- **Port;** same as above.
- **Protocol;** same as above.
- **LogLevel;** Numerous logging levels are provided to log greater and greater details of ssh sessions. Note that "DEBUG" is specifically not recommended other than strictly for debugging ssh communications. "INFO" is the basic level that will record login's of ssh users. "VERBOSE" will record login and logout and is the minimum level, though higher levels are authorized, depending upon site policy.
- **PermitRootLogin;** The secure answer for this is 'no'. By default, users should login to the system with their own non-privilege userID, and either utilize `sudo` or `su` to root to perform administrative functions. The preference there, is for `sudo`.
- **RhostsRSAAuthentication;** This is focused on protocol 1, and should be set to 'no'.
- **HostbasedAuthentication;** Protocol 2-based and should be set to 'no'. If it were enabled, it would be less secure than public/private key usage.
- **IgnoreRhosts;** Will be set to 'no' and thus denies usage of insecure authentication via `.rhost` files.
- **PasswordAuthentication;** Will be set to 'no', denying insecure usage of passwords from the `/etc/passwd` file for allowed users, thus leveraging an emphasis on public/private keys.
- **PermitEmptyPasswords;** Will be set to 'no' to prevent userIDs with blank passwords on this system from being accessed remotely.
- **Banner;** Will be used, pointing to `/etc/issue.net`, to provide all ssh users with a consent-to-use message.

Note: Display of a consent-to-use banner is added to the `sshd_config` file – this hardening process will create this banner later and it is discussed in detail in Section 10. If it is decided to choose not to implement a notification banner, remove the reference to `/etc/issue` from

`sshd_config` manually. Please read the man page section on the legal use and benefits of banners before deciding to remove it.

At least one non-root user account should exist on the system, to avoid access/connectivity problems once this section of the Benchmark is applied, and especially if managing it remotely via SSH. At a minimum the process would be one of:

- To add a user account (which will be used to `su` to root for administrative access):
`useradd <username>`
- Next, include this userID in membership of the `wheel` group so they can switch users (`su`) to root:
`usermod -G wheel <username>`
- Establish the password for the userID, ensuring it is compliant with password complexity rules:
`passwd <username>`

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```

unalias cp rm mv
SSH_CONFIG='/etc/ssh/ssh_config'
SSHD_CONFIG='/etc/ssh/sshd_config'
if [ -e $SSH_CONFIG ]; then
    echo "Securing $SSH_CONFIG"
    grep -v "^Host \*" /etc/ssh/ssh_config-preCIS | grep -v "# Protocol 2,1" \
        > /tmp/cis/ssh_config.tmp
    awk '/^#.* Host / { print "Host *"; print "Protocol 2"; next };
        /^#.*Port / { print "Port 22"; next };
        /^#.*PubkeyAuthentication/ { print "PubkeyAuthentication yes"; next };
        { print }' /tmp/cis/ssh_config.tmp \
        > /tmp/cis/ssh_config.tmp2

    if [ "`egrep -l ^Protocol /tmp/cis/ssh_config.tmp2`" == "" ]; then
        echo 'Protocol 2' >> /tmp/cis/ssh_config.tmp2
    fi
    /bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/ssh_config.tmp2 $SSH_CONFIG
    chown root:root $SSH_CONFIG
    chmod 0644 $SSH_CONFIG
    echo "diff $SSH_CONFIG-preCIS $SSH_CONFIG"
    diff $SSH_CONFIG-preCIS $SSH_CONFIG
else
    echo "OK - No $SSH_CONFIG to secure."
fi

if [ -e $SSHD_CONFIG ]; then
    echo "Securing $SSHD_CONFIG"
    # Had to put the " no" in for the RhostsRSAAuthentication source pattern
    # match, as otherwise the change was taking place twice so the file ended
    # up with TWO records like that. The " no" pattern made the one unique.
    # That 2nd record was a combination of comments in the original file.
    # Some lines ARE duplicated in the original config file, one is commented
    # out, the next one isn't.
    # Also, the spacing below is a little off so lines fit on the page.
    awk '/^#.*Port / { print "Port 22"; next };
        /^#.*Protocol / { print "Protocol 2"; next };
        /^#.*LogLevel / { print "LogLevel VERBOSE"; next };
        /^#PermitRootLogin / { print "PermitRootLogin no"; next };
        /^#RhostsRSAAuthentication no / { print "RhostsRSAAuthentication no"; next };
        /^#HostbasedAuthentication / { print "HostbasedAuthentication no"; next };
    '

```



```

/^#.*IgnoreRhosts /           { print "IgnoreRhosts yes"; next };
/^#.*PasswordAuthentication / { print "PasswordAuthentication no"; next };
/^#.*PermitEmptyPasswords /   { print "PermitEmptyPasswords no"; next };
/^PasswordAuthentication yes/ { next };
/^#.*Banner /                 { print "Banner /etc/issue.net"; next };
                              { print }' /etc/ssh/ssh_config-preCIS \
                              > $SSHD_CONFIG

chown root:root $SSHD_CONFIG
chmod 0600      $SSHD_CONFIG
echo "diff $SSHD_CONFIG-preCIS $SSHD_CONFIG"
      diff $SSHD_CONFIG-preCIS $SSHD_CONFIG
else
  echo "OK - No $SSHD_CONFIG to secure."
fi
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
unset SSH_CONFIG SSHD_CONFIG CONFIGITEM

```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

2.4 Enable System Accounting

Description:

System accounting is an optional process which gathers baseline system data (CPU utilization, disk I/O, etc.) every 10 minutes, by default. The data may be accessed with the sar command, or by reviewing the nightly report files named `/var/log/sa/sar*`. Once a normal baseline for the system has been established, with frequent monitoring - unauthorized activity (password crackers and other CPU-intensive jobs, and activity outside of normal usage hours) may be detected due to departures from the normal system performance curve.

Understandably system accounting provides benefits to system administrators in regards to system functionality, performance, utilization, etc... as a monitoring activity (i.e. NOT prevention). An SA will use it to keep tabs on how well a system is functioning, and/or review such history as a normal part of their routine. When abnormalities occur here, it might be an understandable change, or an out-of-band indicator that some malicious activity has taken place. So this function can support normal auditing (i.e. auditd) not supplant it.

Note: By default, this data is only archived for one week before being automatically removed by the regular nightly cron job. Administrators may wish to independently archive the `/var/log/sa` directory on a regular basis to preserve this data for longer periods.

It is highly recommended to initiate a regular policy and procedure to utilize and review system accounting data to monitor system activity and prevent compromise.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Install package sysstat.

```
yum install sysstat
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3 Minimize xinetd network services

3.1 Disable Standard Services

Description:

On Linux, `inetd` has outpaced `xinetd` as the default network *superserver*. `xinetd` is no longer automatically installed, though is available for installation from the original media. `rpcbind`, for example, can execute without needing `xinetd`. Red Hat Enterprise Linux continues the Red Hat tradition of having `xinetd` available for some of the outdated and deprecated services, though it is reaching the point of being deprecated. The CIS Benchmarks recommend discontinuing its use as soon as possible.

3.1t - Table of xinetd services (usage of these are deprecated)

<u>xinetd Service Name</u>	Default State (from Red Hat)	CIS Benchmark Recommendation
amanda:	off	off
amandaidx:	off	off
amidxtape:	off	off
auth:	off	off
chargen-dgram:	off	off
chargen-stream:	off	off
cvs:	off	off
daytime-dgram:	off	off
daytime-stream:	off	off
discard-dgram:	off	off
discard-stream:	off	off
echo-dgram:	off	off
echo-stream:	off	off
eklogin:	off	off
ekrb5-telnet:	off	off
gssftp:	off	off
klogin:	off	off
krb5-telnet:	off	off
kshell:	off	off
ktalk:	off	off
ntalk:	off	off
rexec:	off	off
rlogin:	off	off
rsh:	off	off
rsync:	off	off
talk:	off	off
tcpmux-server:	off	off
telnet:	off	off
tftp:	off	off
time-dgram:	off	off
time-stream:	off	off
uucp:	off	off

Description (cont'd):

The stock `inetd` and `xinetd` configurations have gotten better and better with each major release over the past years. In 1999, at the time of Red Hat 5.2, distributions offered many services which were either rarely-used or for which there were more secure alternatives. After enabling SSH, it is possible to do away with all `xinetd`-based services, since SSH provides both a secure login mechanism and a means of transferring files to and from the system. The hardening below will disable all standard services normally enabled in the Red Hat `xinetd` configuration.

When running these commands, one or more errors like this may be displayed:

```
error reading information on service xxx: No such file or directory
```

This is perfectly acceptable, as all it means is the software for that service was not installed.

The rest of the actions in this section give the administrator the option of re-enabling certain services. Rather than disabling and then re-enabling these services, experienced administrators may wish to simply disable only those services that they know are unnecessary for their systems. One size does not fit all---therefore, not all services shall have the same setting across all the systems in any given enterprise. If there is any doubt, it is better to disable everything, then re-enable one-by-one the necessary services based on the function of the server.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
for SERVICE in \
    amanda \
    chargen \
    chargen-udp \
    cups \
    cups-lpd \
    daytime \
    daytime-udp \
    echo \
    echo-udp \
    eklogin \
    ekrb5-telnet \
    finger \
    gssftp \
    imap \
    imaps \
    ipop2 \
    ipop3 \
    klogin \
    krb5-telnet \
    kshell \
    ktalk \
    ntalk \
    rexec \
    rlogin \
    rsh \
    rsync \
    talk \
    tcpmux-server \
    telnet \
    tftp \
    time-dgram \
    time-stream \
```

```
uucp;
do
  if [ -e /etc/xinetd.d/$SERVICE ]; then
    echo "Disabling SERVICE($SERVICE) - `ls -la /etc/xinetd.d/$SERVICE`."
    chkconfig ${SERVICE} off
  else
    echo "OK. SERVICE doesn't exist on this system ($SERVICE)."
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.2 Configure TCP Wrappers and Firewall to Limit Access

Description:

Question:

Is there a reason to allow unlimited network access to this server?

If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.

TCP Wrappers and Host-Based Firewalls are presented together as they are similar and complementary in functionality.

TCP Wrappers

By limiting access to the server, exposure to threats from attackers on remote systems is reduced. For Internet-connected servers that provide service to the whole Internet, limiting access may not make sense. Intranet servers, limited-access servers, and workstations should limit access to only authorized networks. To display which services are compiled with TCPwrappers support included, do this:

```
egrep libwrap /sbin/* /usr/sbin/* | sort
```

Many daemons (SSH for example) are compiled with TCP Wrapper support built-in, so use `/etc/hosts.allow` and `/etc/hosts.deny` to limit SSH access to the systems. The portmap daemon also uses TCP wrappers and there is a specific note to this effect in the default TCP wrappers config files.

Note: It is important to be aware that TCP wrappers looks at `hosts.allow` first, then `hosts.deny`, and controls access based on the first match. Omitting entries in `hosts.allow` and deny access to ALL in `hosts.deny`, will result in all access being blocked to all network clients.

Host-Based Firewalls

Host-based firewalls (also known as personal firewalls) have the following benefits:

Protection from compromised systems on the local network;

Defense in depth where an attacker must overcome both the border firewall and the host-based firewall to attack a system; extremely fine tuned control over what systems may or may not access the system.

The Center for Internet Security recommends installing a host-based firewall on workstations, and suggests end-users consider installing them on servers as well.

Workstations are defined as Red Hat Linux systems that offer no services to any external network or system. For example, a workstation that is running Apache and serving up content to the local network segment is not a workstation.

Host-based firewalls are available in iptables (installed by default) or via commercial offerings. The Center for Internet Security makes no recommendations for a vendor or even a specific firewall configuration as firewalls are very complex. Entire books have been written on iptables and are outside the scope of this Benchmark. The default Red Hat `iptables` configuration is suitable for workstations and is a good starting point for servers. The Center for Internet Security does recommend using a tool (graphical- or text-based) to configure the `iptables` firewall, as manual rule configuration is extremely error-prone and you may end up with a false sense of security and have a less secure system.

See the following iptables resources:

Web-Based:

Linux Firewall Design Tool - <http://linux-firewall-tools.com/linux/firewall/index.html>

Package-Based:

FireHOL - <http://firehol.sourceforge.net>

Firewall Builder - <http://sourceforge.net/projects/fwbuilder>

GuardDog - <http://www.simonzone.com/software/guarddog>

Note: Inclusion of a tool on this list is not an endorsement or recommendation by the Center for Internet Security.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Note: Positively ensure remote access to the system is allowed, before configuring and implementing `deny-access` rules. Complete both parts of this section.

TCP Wrappers

Deny access to this server from all networks:

```
xyz=`tail -1 /etc/hosts.deny`
if [ "$xyz" != "ALL: ALL" ]; then
    # Only make the change once
    echo "ALL: ALL" >> /etc/hosts.deny
fi
chown root:root /etc/hosts.deny
chmod 0644 /etc/hosts.deny
echo "diff /etc/hosts.deny-preCIS /etc/hosts.deny"
diff /etc/hosts.deny-preCIS /etc/hosts.deny
```

To allow access from the authorized networks, refer to the `hosts.allow` man page and enter the service and the network in `/etc/hosts.allow`. At a minimum, allow `localhost` traffic. The following script will create a sample `hosts.allow` file that will allow access to the locally connected networks. Tailor this further to narrow traffic down to only what is appropriate for the network.

```
printf "ALL: localhost" >> /etc/hosts.allow
for I in `ifconfig | grep "inet addr" | cut -f2 -d: | cut -f1-3 -d"." \
| grep -v ^127 | sort -n`
do
    echo "Adding (, $I) to /etc/hosts.allow."
    printf ", $I." >> /etc/hosts.allow;
done
echo >> /etc/hosts.allow
chown root:root /etc/hosts.allow
chmod 0644 /etc/hosts.allow
echo "diff /etc/hosts.allow-preCIS /etc/hosts.allow"
diff /etc/hosts.allow-preCIS /etc/hosts.allow
```

Note: The above script assumes a netmask of `255.255.255.0`. If the system being worked on is within a different network context, then adjust `/etc/hosts.allow` for the environment.

Note: The above script ignores IPv6 networking. Additional hardening is necessary for any system/network which requires IPv6. The SNAC guidance from NSA (refer to Reference G, in Appendix D) has excellent coverage of IPv6 protections for RHEL5. IPv6 is enabled by default in RHEL5. To disable IPv6, add `"install ipv6 /bin/true"` into the `"/etc/modprobe.d/blacklist"` file, as that will prevent the `ipv6` module from loading.

Review the resulting `/etc/hosts.allow` file to ensure it meets mission application needs. Test the configuration by logging in remotely.

It is recommended to further customize/harden the system configuration, though doing so is not further included in the scoring. For example, if the requirement is to ensure that only one IP address, `192.168.50.4`, can access SSH on the server at `192.168.50.2`, then follow the example below.

Change `/etc/hosts.allow` from:

```
ALL: localhost, 192.168.50.2/255.255.255.0
```

to:

```
sshd : 192.168.50.4
```

```
ALL EXCEPT sshd: localhost, 192.168.50.4/255.255.255.255
```

Further customization of TCP Wrappers is beyond the scope of this Benchmark.

Firewall

See discussion.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.3 Only Enable telnet, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason that requires users to access this system via telnet, rather than the more secure SSH protocol?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

`telnet` uses an unencrypted network protocol, which means data from the login session (such as passwords and all other data transmitted during the session) can be stolen by eavesdroppers on the network, and also that the session can be hijacked by outsiders to gain access to the remote system.

The freely-available SSH utilities that ship with Red Hat Enterprise Linux (see <http://www.openssh.com>) provide encrypted network logins and should be used instead.

To aid in the migration to SSH, there is a freely available SSH client for Windows called `putty`, which is available from Simon Tatham (see <http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty>). Additionally, there are numerous viable open-source and commercially supported SSH clients as well – check to see if the local Enterprise already has an Enterprise SSH client.

Some Enterprises are using `telnet` over SSL, however, the simpler and more standard solution is to use SSH. Configuring `telnet` over SSL is beyond the scope of a Level 1 Benchmark and will not be addressed here.

It is understood that large Enterprises deeply entrenched in using `telnet`, it may take considerable effort in migrating from `telnet` to `ssh`, so `telnet` may have to be enabled. When it can be disabled, simply run `chkconfig telnet off` to turn it off again.

This Benchmark scores `telnet` as a failure when it is active.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
chkconfig telnet on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.4 Only Enable FTP, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Question:

Is this machine an FTP server, or is there a mission-critical reason why data must be transferred to and from this system via an ftp server, rather than sftp or scp?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

Note: Red Hat switched from distributing `wu-ftp` to `vsftpd` after RHEL2.1 was released. For security reasons, as well as consistency with future Red Hat versions, consider replacing

`wu-ftp` with `vsftpd`. `vsftpd` is available on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux distribution media and is the standard, fully supported `ftp` daemon for RHEL5.

Like `telnet`, the `ftp` protocol is unencrypted, which means passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be captured by sniffing the network, and that the `ftp` session itself can be hijacked by an external attacker. Anonymous `ftp` servers are common for providing fast and easy downloading of publicly available files, however anonymous access should be configured to not allow uploading of files to the `ftp` server. `ftp` servers are also commonly used for Web Servers, but should be replaced by `sftp` if possible. `ftp` / `sftp` access should be chrooted to include the document root of the web site or the portion of the web site that the individual is responsible for. Of course access to the system configuration files and other web files is to be excluded from the chrooted environment. This is especially important if there are multiple web sites.

SSH provides two different encrypted file transfer mechanisms – `scp` and `sftp` – either of which should be used instead of the vanilla `ftp` client. Even if `ftp` is required, consider requiring non-anonymous users on the system to transfer files via SSH-based protocols. For further information on restricting `ftp` access to the system, see section 8.2 below.

Note: Any directory writable by an anonymous `ftp` server should have its own partition. This helps prevent an `ftp` server from filling a hard drive used by other services.

To aid in the migration away from `ftp`, there are a number of freely available `scp` and `sftp` client for Windows, such as FileZilla from <http://sourceforge.net/projects/filezilla> and WinSCP available from <http://winscp.sourceforge.net/eng/index.php> which provides for a Graphical interface to putty, and `pscp`, which is a part of the previously mentioned putty package.

Some Enterprises are using `ftp` over SSL, however, the simpler and more standard solution is to use `sftp`. Configuring `ftp` over SSL, as well as demonstrating how to employ `sftp`, is beyond the scope of a Level 1 Benchmark and will not be addressed here.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
chkconfig --levels 35 vsftpd on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.5 Only Enable rlogin/rsh/rcp, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

The r-commands suffer from the same hijacking and sniffing issues as `telnet` and `ftp`, and in addition have a number of well-known weaknesses in their authentication scheme. SSH was designed to be a drop-in replacement for these protocols. Given the wide availability of free SSH implementations, it

seems unlikely that there is ever a case where these tools cannot be replaced with SSH (again, see <http://www.openssh.com>).

If these protocols are left enabled, please also see section 8.1 for additional security-related configuration settings.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason why rlogin/rsh/rcp must be used instead of the more secure ssh/scp?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig login on
chkconfig rlogin on
chkconfig rsh on
chkconfig shell on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.6 Only Enable TFTP Server, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

TFTP is typically used for network booting of diskless workstations, X-terminals, and other similar devices. Routers and other network devices may copy configuration data to remote systems via TFTP for backup. However, unless this system is needed in one of these roles, it is best to leave the TFTP service disabled.

Note: The tftp-server software is not installed by default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux. It must be manually selected for installation to use it. After installing it, perform the actions below.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this system a boot server or is there some other mission-critical reason why data must be transferred to and from this system via TFTP?

One possibility is a system used to serve Red Hat kickstart. In that case, the tftp service is necessary for initial PXE load of the boot image across the network.

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig tftp on
if [ -e "/tftpboot" ] ; then
    chown -R root:root /tftpboot
    chmod -R 0744 /tftpboot
else
    mkdir -m 0744 /tftpboot && chown root:root /tftpboot
```

fi

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.7 Only Enable cyrus-imapd, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

{Formerly [IMAP](#)}

Remote mail clients (like Eudora, Netscape Mail and Kmail) may retrieve mail from remote mail servers using IMAP, the Internet Message Access Protocol, or POP, the Post Office Protocol. If this system is a mail server that must offer this protocol, [cyrus-imapd](#) may be activated. [cyrus-imapd](#) activates an SSL-encrypted, and thus much safer, version of IMAP. Standard IMAP is not encrypted and allows an attacker to eavesdrop on all e-mails being transferred or to take over the connection. It may, based on which authentication method is used, allow an attacker to steal user passwords as well.

It is recommended to generate a new SSL certificate. For more information, consult

http://www.redhat.com/docs/manuals/enterprise/RHEL-5-manual/Deployment_Guide-en-US/s1-email-mua.html#s2-email-security.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine a mail server with a mission-critical reason to use imap to serve mail to remote mail clients? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

`chkconfig cyrus-imapd on`

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

3.8 Only Enable dovecot, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

{Formerly [POP](#)}

Remote mail clients (like Eudora, Netscape Mail and Kmail) may retrieve mail from remote mail servers using IMAP, the Internet Message Access Protocol, or POP, the Post Office Protocol. If this system is a mail server that must offer the POP protocol, [dovecot](#) may be activated.

[dovecot](#) activates an SSL-encrypted, and thus much safer, version of POP. Standard POP is not encrypted and thus allows an attacker to eavesdrop on all e-mails being transferred or to take over the connection. It may – based on which authentication method is used – allow an attacker to steal user passwords as well. POP-SSL suffers none of these problems. It is recommended to generate a new SSL certificate.

For more information, consult:

http://www.redhat.com/docs/manuals/enterprise/RHEL-5-manual/Deployment_Guide-en-US/s1-email-mua.html#s2-email-security

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine a mail server with a mission-critical reason to use pop to serve mail to remote mail clients? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

`chkconfig dovecot on`

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4 Minimize boot services

The following table illustrates each of the services potentially available natively within RHEL5. The first seven columns describe the service, by name and the default state per runlevel, as distributed by Red Hat. The next two rows show the CIS Benchmark recommendation for run levels 3 and 5, multi-user modes for text and graphical desktop respectively. This table accounts for services available natively through release 5.1---and is subject to change in future editions distributed by Red Hat.

4t Table of RHEL5 inetd/boot Services

//table current as of RHEL5.1 {20080204}//								CIS Benchmark Recommendation	
inetd/boot Services	Default							3	5
	Boot state applicable to each runlevel								
acpid	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
amd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
anacron	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
apmd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
arptables_jf	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
arpwatch	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
atd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
auditd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
autofs	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
avahi-daemon	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
avahi-dnssconfd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
bgpd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
bluetooth	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
bootparamd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
capi	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
conman	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
cpuspeed	0:off	1:on	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
crond	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
cups	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
cyrus-imapd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dc_client	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dc_server	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dhcdbd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dhcp6s	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dhcpcd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dhcrelay	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dovecot	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
dund	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
firstboot	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:off	5:on	6:off	off	off
gpm	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
haldaemon	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
hidd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
hplip	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
httpd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
ibmasm	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
innd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off

//table current as of RHEL5.1 {20080204}//								CIS Benchmark Recommendation	
inetd/boot Services	Default							3	5
	Boot state applicable to each runlevel								
ip6tables ²	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
ipmi	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
iptables	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
irda	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
irqbalance³	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
iscsi	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
iscsid	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
isdn	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
kadmind	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
kdumpp	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
kprop	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
krb524	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
krb5kdc	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
kudzu	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
ldap	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
lisa	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
lm_sensors	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
mailman	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
mcstrans	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
mdmonitor	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
mdmdd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
messagebus	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
microcode_ctl	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
multipathd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
mysqld	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
named	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
netfs	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
netplugd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
network	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
NetworkManager ⁴	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
NetworkManagerDispatcher	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	on	on
nfs	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
nfslock	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
nscd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
ntpd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
openibd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
ospf6d	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
ospfd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
pand	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
pcscd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
portmap	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
postgresql	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
privoxy	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
psacct	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
radiusd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off

² CIS recommends enabling this for systems utilizing IPv6, but should leave it disabled for systems with only IPv4

³ Preferably *on* for any multi-core or multi-processor system, optional for single-core/single processor systems

⁴ Preferably *off* for all systems without wireless NIC cards; enable it for systems with wireless connectivity

//table current as of RHEL5.1 {20080204}//								CIS Benchmark Recommendation	
inetd/boot Services	Default							3	5
	Boot state applicable to each runlevel								
radvd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
rarpd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
rdisc	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
readahead_early	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
readahead_later	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:on	6:off	off	off
restorecond⁵	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
rhnsd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
ripd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
ripngd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
rpcgssd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
rpcidmapd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
rpcsvcgssd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
rstatd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
rusersd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
rwhod	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
saslauthd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
sendmail	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
setroubleshoot	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
smartd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
smb	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
snmpd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
snmptrapd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
spamassassin	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
squid	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
sshd	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
syslog	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	on	on
sysstat	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:off	5:on	6:off	on	on
tog-pegasus	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
tomcat5	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
tux	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
vncserver	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
vsftpd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
winbind	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
wpa_supplicant	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
xend	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
xendomains	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
xfs	0:off	1:off	2:on	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
xinetd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
ypbind	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
yppasswdd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
ypserv	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
ypxfrd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off
yum-updatesd	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:on	4:on	5:on	6:off	off	off
zebra	0:off	1:off	2:off	3:off	4:off	5:off	6:off	off	off

<end of table>

⁵ Natively restores the SELinux contex/condition to files; prevents files from being mis-labeled in their security context

4.1 Set Daemon umask

Description:

The system default `umask` should be set to at least `027` (allowed to be as high as `077`, with testing in the local environment) in order to prevent daemon processes (such as the `syslog` daemon) from creating world-writable files by default. If a particular daemon needs a less restrictive `umask`, consider editing that specific daemon startup script to grant that daemon the required `umask` while maintaining the increased server security posture for all the others.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
sed 's/022/027/' /etc/rc.d-preCIS/init.d/functions > /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
echo "umask 027" >> /etc/sysconfig/init
```

```
chown root:root /etc/sysconfig/init
chmod 0755 /etc/sysconfig/init
echo "diff /etc/sysconfig/init-preCIS /etc/sysconfig/init"
diff /etc/sysconfig/init-preCIS /etc/sysconfig/init
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.2 Disable xinetd, If Possible

Description:

If the actions in Section 3 of this Benchmark resulted in no services being enabled in the `inet` super daemon `/etc/xinetd.d`, then the `xinetd` service may be disabled completely on this system.

Experienced SysAdmins have learned the `inet` super daemon should be restarted after a change to its configuration file. This is not necessary in this case as the system will be rebooted and the change will take effect at that time.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
echo "The 'chkconfig' status of 'xinetd' is shown before it is turned off and"
echo "then after so it can visually be compared."
echo "Note: The remaining chkconfig checks, in this hardening script, do the"
echo "same thing."
chkconfig --list xinetd
chkconfig --level 12345 xinetd off
chkconfig --list xinetd
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.3 Ensure sendmail is only listening to the localhost, If Possible

Description:

By default, the sendmail daemon on Red Hat systems listens on port 25/tcp for email messages from the local machine only. If the machine is not acting as an email server, then there should not be a reason for this system to receive incoming email messages from other hosts on the network. The check below ensures that the sendmail daemon is listening only on the internal "loopback" network for outgoing messages generated on the local system. This configuration prevents direct access to the sendmail daemon from external network devices and greatly reduces the impact of future sendmail vulnerabilities on the local machine.

Leaving sendmail in local-only mode permits mail to be sent out from the local system. If the local system will not be processing or sending any electronic mail, then the sendmail service should be completely disabled. If you completely disable sendmail for local use, messages sent to the root account, such as for cron job output or audit daemon warnings, will fail to be delivered properly unless submitted to a central email server.

That mail server must be configured to correctly handle email addressed directly to root, as well as to other users from the local machine.

As a viable alternative to sendmail, 'postfix' is recommended for installation and use. Currently the inclusion and hardening of postfix is not included within this Benchmark.

(1) It is possible to run a Unix system with the `sendmail` daemon disabled and still allow users on that system to send email out from that machine. Running `sendmail` in "daemon mode" (with the `-bd` command-line option) is only required on machines that act as a mail server, receiving and processing email interactively to and from other hosts on the network.

(2) Although recent versions of Red Hat have set `sendmail` to listen only to the loopback network interface, this document still deactivates sendmail from operating in "daemon mode". Listening on the loopback interface still presents a slightly higher level of exposure to miscreant attack than not listening at all. Experienced administrators will understand that a chroot-jailed user or program can still properly interact with a `sendmail` process listening on the loopback interface.

Note: If the system is an email server, the administrator is encouraged to search the Web for additional insight on Sendmail security issues. Some information is available at:

<http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/sysadmin/sendmail.html>

<http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/sysadmin/sendmail2.html>

http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/sysadmin/greet_pause.html

<http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/sysadmin/Sendmail-Unprivileged.html>

<http://www.sendmail.org>

(3) If mail services are not needed on the host disable the mail server (Sendmail, postfix, qmail, etc.). If mail services are required only to relay locally generated messages then configure the mail server to listen only on the loopback interface. If this host will act as a full fledged mail server then secure the

configuration of the mail server as appropriate (insert links and pointers to secure configuration guidelines for various types of mail servers).

Audit:

```
grep MTA /etc/mail/sendmail.cf | grep "Addr=127.0.0.1, " | wc -l
```

Returns "1" when set up correctly (for the following context line from the `sendmail.cf` file)

```
O DaemonPortOptions=Port=smtpp,Addr=127.0.0.1, Name=MTA
```

Remediation:

Question:

Is this system a mail server – that is, does this machine receive and process email from other hosts?

Proceed with the appropriate actions below.

Yes – employment of sendmail:

```
cd /etc/sysconfig
cp -pf sendmail-preCIS sendmail
chown root:root sendmail
chmod 0644 sendmail
```

No – sendmail is not required:

```
echo "DAEMON=no" > /etc/sysconfig/sendmail
echo "QUEUE=1h" >> /etc/sysconfig/sendmail
chkconfig --list sendmail
chkconfig --level 12345 sendmail off
chkconfig --list sendmail
chown root:root /etc/sysconfig/sendmail
chmod 0644 /etc/sysconfig/sendmail
echo "diff /etc/sysconfig/sendmail-preCIS /etc/sysconfig/sendmail"
diff /etc/sysconfig/sendmail-preCIS /etc/sysconfig/sendmail
```

Note: The email server need not be running to send outgoing mail.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.4 Disable GUI Login, If Possible

Description:

There is usually no reason to run X Windows on a dedicated server machine, such as a dedicated web server. This action disables the graphical login, if present, leaving the user to login via SSH or a local text-based console. Even if the GUI login screen is deactivated (going back to run level 3), unprivileged users can still run X Windows by typing `startx` at the shell prompt. Doing so assumes the `xf`s service is running (which must be accomplished by root; see section 4.5).

In Red Hat Enterprise Linux, there are two predominant runlevels for operation. Runlevel 5 boots directly into X Windows, so as to allow graphical login or easy use of specialized X terminals and

other convenient graphical tools. Otherwise, for normal text-based console login, runlevel 3 is desirable. GUI login is activated or deactivated by changing this runlevel in `/etc/inittab`.

Note: runlevel 3 allows a user to run X Windows (assuming the `xfs` service is running) by typing:
`startx`

Permissions on the `/etc/inittab` file are recommended at 0600, though they can be as open as 0644, if the system or a local application requires it, though this should be a rare exception.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason to run a GUI login program on this system?

If the answer to this question is no, proceed with the actions below.

```
echo "RunLevel was (`grep initdefault /etc/inittab | grep -v NOT`)."
sed -e 's/id:5:initdefault:/id:3:initdefault:/' /etc/inittab-preCIS >
/etc/inittab
chown root:root /etc/inittab
chmod 0600 /etc/inittab
echo "diff /etc/inittab-preCIS /etc/inittab"
diff /etc/inittab-preCIS /etc/inittab
echo "New runLevel will be (`grep initdefault /etc/inittab | grep -v NOT`)."

```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.5 Disable X Font Server, If Possible

Description:

There's usually no reason to run X Windows on a dedicated server machine, like a dedicated web server. If an X server is not necessary on this machine, this action will deactivate the X font server (`xfs`) upon which X Windows is dependent. The X font server isn't used by any other process. An unprivileged user cannot start the X font server, though. This must be accomplished by root.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason to run X Windows on this system?

If the answer to this question is no, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig --list xfs
chkconfig --level 12345 xfs off
chkconfig --list xfs

```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.6 Disable Standard Boot Services

Description:

Every system daemon that does not have a clear and compelling purpose to be executing on the host should be deactivated. This greatly reduces the chances that the machine will be running a vulnerable daemon when the next vulnerability is discovered in its operating system.

Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a facility called `chkconfig` to manage all the SysV rc-scripts. `chkconfig` adds or deletes links in each of the appropriate runlevel directories (`/etc/rc.d/rc*.d`) to activate or deactivate each of the rc-scripts.

This process "`chkconfig's`" all of the rc-scripts off, so that the local administrator can easily reactivate any of these scripts upon discovery of a mission-critical need for one of these services. One could reactivate the daemon script by typing `chkconfig daemon on` in most cases, which activates it in runlevels 2 through 5. If one of these runlevels is undesirable, like runlevel 2 for the NFS script, or the script needs to run in one of the other available runlevels, `chkconfig` takes the argument "`--level <levels>`" where one can explicitly specify runlevels that it should act on.

Note: The vendor patches may restore some of the original entries in the startup script directories `/etc/rc.d/rc*.d` – it is always a good idea to check these boot directories and remove any scripts that may have been added by the patch installation process. This would be a good time to ensure this check is in the local Enterprise OS Upgrade Procedure.

The rest of the actions in this section give the administrator the option of re-enabling certain services – in particular, the services that are disabled in the second loop in the "Action" section below. Rather than disabling and then re-enabling these services, experienced administrators may wish to simply disable only those services that they know are unnecessary for their systems.

The third loop in the "Action" section locks daemon-user accounts related to servers that we examine by setting a lockout password. This will not prevent a given daemon from running as these users – it simply confirms that these users are not available for human login. It also changes the shell to `/sbin/nologin` (standard for most service accounts under RHEL5) for an additional layer of security as long as shell access is not necessary.

Note: Not all of the scripts listed below will exist on all systems, as this is a superset of the available rc-scripts in the various Red Hat distribution versions. The Benchmark's recommended action will register some trivial errors on each distribution version as a result – these are not cause for alarm.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
telinit 3
```

Once logged back in as root:

```

echo " When doing this from within Xwindows the display will slow to a horrible"
echo " crawl as soon as the xfs service is disabled. Recommend doing this"
echo " script from init 3 (runlevel 3)."
```

From a scripted perspective, this will be backwards from what the CIS Benchmark
recommends. Philosophy is to leave the few known/necessary services on, that
do remain in the minimalized baseline, and then as each other step/procedure
below is covered, it will disable what we know we don't need for a secure and
hardened baseline.

```

#
# The following services ARE stopped/disabled using the following effort for the
# baseline:
#
# This affects network/NFS mapping during system building and/or during kickstart
# %post processing.
#   autofs
#   automount
#   iptables
#   portmap
#   NFS services
#   NFS statd
#   system message bus

# ** Warning** Disabling 'nfs' at this point in the script forcefully unmounts
#               any NFS network mounts.
# The following services should normally be enabled, unless there is a compelling
# reason not to: (which is why this hardening section does not alter their state)
```

```

for SERVICE in
    acpid
    amd
    anacron
    apmd
    arptables_jf
    aprwatch
    atd
    autofs
    avahi-daemon
    avahi-dnsconfd
    bpgd
    bluetooth
    bootparamd
    capi
    conman
    cups
    cyrus-imapd
    dc_client
    dc_server
    dhcdd
    dhcp6s
    dhcpd
    dhcrelay
    dovecot
    dund
    firstboot
    gpm
    haldaemon
    hidd

```

```
hplip \
httpd \
ibmasm \
ip6tables \
ipmi \
irda \
iscsi \
iscsid \
isdn \
kadmin \
kdump \
kprop \
krb524 \
krb5kdc \
kudzu \
ldap \
lisa \
lm_sensors \
mailman \
mcstrans \
mdmonitor \
mdmpd \
microcode_ctl \
multipathd \
mysqld \
named \
netfs \
netplugd \
network \
NetworkManager \
nfs \
nfslock \
nscd \
ntpd \
openibd \
ospf6d \
ospfd \
pand \
pcscd \
portmap \
postgresql \
privoxy \
psacct \
radvd \
rarpd \
rdisc \
readahead_early \
readahead_later \
rhnsd \
ripd \
ripngd \
rpcgssd \
rpcidmapd \
rpcsvcgssd \
rstatd \
rusersd \
rwhod \
saslauthd \
sendmail \
```

```

setroubleshoot      \
smartd              \
smb                 \
snmpd               \
snmptrapd           \
spamassassin        \
squid                \
tog-pegasus         \
tomcat5             \
tux                 \
winbind             \
wine                \
wpa_supplicant      \
xend                \
xendomains          \
xfs                 \
xinetd              \
ypbind              \
yppasswdd           \
ypserv              \
ypxfrd              \
yum-updatesd        \
zebra;
do
    if [ -e /etc/init.d/$SERVICE ]; then
        # Doing business this way causes less needless errors that a
        # reviewer of the hardening process doesn't need to deal with.
        service $SERVICE stop
        chkconfig --level 12345 $SERVICE off
    else
        echo "SERVICE doesn't exist on this system ($SERVICE)."

```

Scoring Status: Scorable, Not Scorable or Not Applicable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.7 Only Enable SMB (Windows File Sharing) Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Red Hat Enterprise Linux includes the popular Open Source Samba server for providing file and print services to Windows-based systems. This allows a Unix system to act as a file or print server in on a Windows network, and even act as a Domain Controller (authentication server) to older Windows operating systems. However, if this functionality is not required by the site, the service should be disabled.

This section removes the SMB client software as well. If there is a mission-oriented reason to mount Windows Shares, do not remove the packages: `samba-client` and `samba-common`.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine sharing files via the Windows file sharing protocols?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig smb on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.8 Only Enable NFS Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

NFS is frequently exploited to gain unauthorized access to files and systems. Clearly there is no need to run the NFS server-related daemons on hosts that are not NFS servers of vital mission application filesystems. If the system is an NFS server, the administrator should take reasonable precautions when exporting file systems, including restricting NFS access to a specific range of local IP addresses and exporting file systems "read-only" to the greatest extent possible. For more information, consult the [exports](#) manual page.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason why this machine must serve as an NFS file server?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig --level 35 nfs on  
chkconfig --level 35 portmapper on  
chkconfig --level 35 rpc on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.9 Only Enable NFS Client Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Again, unless there is a significant need for this system to acquire data via NFS, administrators should disable NFS-related services.

Note: Other file transfer schemes (such as [rdist](#) via SSH) can often be preferable to NFS for certain applications.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason why this system must access file systems from remote servers via NFS?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig --level 35 nfslock on
chkconfig --level 35 autofs on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.10 Only Enable NIS Client Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Unless this site must use NIS, it should really be avoided. While it can be very useful for simplifying and transparently scaling the management for a large number of workstations (and servers), it's not well designed for security. Even Sun Microsystems is phasing out NIS+ in favor of LDAP for naming services – NIS and NIS+ are now reaching end of life. Where possible, utilize LDAP.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason why this machine must be an NIS client?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig ypbind on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.11 Only Enable NIS Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Unless this site must use NIS, it should be avoided. While it can be very useful for transparently scaling the number of workstations, it is not well designed for security.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason why this machine must be an NIS server?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig ypserv on  
chkconfig yppasswdd on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.12 Only Enable RPC Portmap Process, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

RPC-based services typically use very weak or non-existent authentication and yet may share very sensitive information. Unless one of the services listed above is required on this machine, best to disable RPC-based tools completely. If there is uncertainty in whether or not a particular third-party application requires RPC services, consult with the application vendor.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Are any of the following statements true?

- This machine is an NFS client or server. This machine is an NIS (YP) or NIS+ client or server
- The machine runs a third-party software application which is dependent on RPC support

If the answer to both of these questions is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig --level 35 portmap on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.13 Only Enable netfs Script, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

If there are no network file sharing protocols being used, one can deactivate the `netfs` script. This script mounts network drives on the client. Though this is not a persistent daemon and thus not so dangerous, thinning out the `/etc/rc.d/rcN.d` directories makes the system much easier to audit.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine sharing files via the NFS, Novell Netware or Windows file sharing protocols?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
chkconfig --level 35 netfs on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.14 Only Enable Printer Daemon Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

If users will never print files from this machine and the system will never be used as a print server by other hosts on the network, then it is safe to disable the print daemon, `lpd` or `cupsd`, and removed the relevant packages from the system. The Unix print servers have generally had a poor security record – be sure to keep up-to-date on vendor patches, if such services are required.

Note: This item also sets `cupsd`, when present, to run as a non-root user and group, namely user `lp` and group `sys`; which is more secure.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this system a print server, or is there a mission-critical reason why users must submit print jobs from this system?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

```
if [ -e /etc/init.d/cups ]; then
    echo "Enable appropriate cups permissions and ownership"
    sed -e 's/^\#User lp/User lp/' -e 's/^\#Group sys/Group sys/' \
        /etc/cups/cupsd.conf-preCIS > /etc/cups/cupsd.conf
    chown lp:sys /etc/cups/cupsd.conf
    chmod 0600 /etc/cups/cupsd.conf
    echo "diff /etc/cups/cupsd.conf-preCIS /etc/cups/cupsd.conf"
    diff /etc/cups/cupsd.conf-preCIS /etc/cups/cupsd.conf
    chkconfig cups on
fi
```

```
# If this system does need printing capabilities, but does not need to act as a
# print server, then configure the /etc/cups/client.conf file with the
# "ServerName" directive, pointing to a system running the cups server
echo "ServerName printserver.yourdomain.com" >> /etc/cups/client.conf
chown root:lp /etc/cups/client.conf
chmod 0644 /etc/cups/client.conf
echo "diff /etc/cups/client.conf-preCIS /etc/cups/client-conf"
diff /etc/cups/client.conf-preCIS /etc/cups/client-conf
```

Obviously, replace "printserver.yourdomain.com" with an appropriate FQDN.

If the answer to this question is no, then remove the following, though some of these packages might or might not be installed, depending upon how the system was built:

```
rpm -e bluez-utilz-cups
rpm -e cups
rpm -e libgnomecups
rpm -e cups-libs
```

```
rpm -e hal-cups-utils
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.15 Only Enable Web Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Even if this machine is a web server, the local site may choose not to use the web server provided with Linux in favor of a locally developed and supported Web environment.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason why this system must run a Web server on this system?

Web Servers should be run on dedicated systems serving only as web server. Unfortunately web servers tend to be enabled on many systems that don't need the web service, and are often not properly secured and administered. If Apache (the default web server) is required, review and apply the CIS Apache Benchmark available at http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_apache.html.

Note: The Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses `piranha` to administer the Linux Virtual Server software, which requires `apache` and `php`.

If this is not a web server, and are not using `piranha`, the answer is no.

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

If Apache is used, download and apply appropriate recommendations from the CIS Apache Benchmark.

Please read the discussion before executing these commands and select the appropriate one(s).

```
chkconfig apache on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.16 Only Enable SNMP Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

If SNMP is used to monitor the hosts on this network, experts recommend changing the default community string used to access data via SNMP. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems, this parameter has already been changed to a reasonably secure setting in the file `/etc/snmp/snmpd.conf`:
`com2sec notConfigUser default public`

No further action is required.

Note: In a large Enterprise that relied heavily on SNMP, it was discovered during the Linux rollout that SNMP was not a critical service, and not having it enabled increased the security posture of the servers. When using HP hardware with the HP provided health monitoring tools, SNMP and WBEM are the only options for reporting currently (and SNMP is the more granular). Because of this some organizations may require it.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Are hosts at this site remotely monitored by a tool (e.g., HP OpenView, MRTG, Cricket) that relies on SNMP? If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the action:

`chkconfig snmpd on`

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.17 Only Enable DNS Server Process, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Most of the machines in the organization do not need a DNS server running on the box. Unless this is one of the organization's name servers, it is safe to shut this down.

If this must be left active, please patch often and security harden the configuration according to the CIS BIND Benchmark which provides detailed implementation and configurations recommendations. Two highly suggested configuration is to bind the DNS server program in a chroot environment, and run it as a non-root user. This significantly restricts the resources that the DNS server has access to on the system, reducing this set to the minimum required for the program to function properly. Carefully consider the consequences that if a name server is compromised then traffic that depends on the name service such as web, ftp and e-mail can be redirected to malicious servers.

Additionally, consider the use of Access Control Lists (ACL's) in `/etc/named.conf` to limit who can query the name server. For example, Internal name servers should not respond to outside requests. Large Enterprises run multiple name servers so this should not be an issue. However, smaller organizations may not be able to deploy both internal and external name servers and should instead use

an reputable externally hosted DNS service. Details on how to accomplish this are provided in the CIS BIND Benchmark, available at http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_bind.html

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine a DNS server, or name server, for this site?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

Download and following the appropriate configurations from the CIS BIND Benchmark, then enable the BIND as follows.

`chkconfig named on`

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.18 Only Enable SQL Server Processes, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

If this machine does not need to run the mainstream database (SQL) servers Postgres or MySQL, it is safe to deactivate them. If they must be enabled, issue the command (below) for the database that is installed.

Additional hardening of SQL functionality and security can and should be accomplished, though are outside the scope of this Level I Benchmark. Such actions include utilizing a strong password of sufficient complexity, limiting access to the database administrative accounts, etc...

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine an SQL (database) server?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

Please read the discussion before executing these commands and select the appropriate command.

`chkconfig postgresql on`

`chkconfig mysqld on`

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.19 Only Enable Squid Cache Server, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

Squid can actually be beneficial to security, as it imposes a proxy between the client and server. On the other hand, if it is not being used, it should be deactivated and removed. This deactivation decreases the risk of system compromise should a security vulnerability later be discovered in Squid. Finally, for any site that uses Squid, configure it carefully. Many Squid caches are badly configured to either allow outsider attackers to probe internal machines through the firewall or to use the cache to hide their true source IP address from their target hosts. Each site should configure Squid to not allow people outside their perimeter to use the cache without authentication of some sort. A better deployment for squid is on a server with no external-facing network interface (unless using it for a reverse web proxy, which is a very specific installation, and beyond the scope of this Benchmark).

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Do you use the squid web cache to speed up web transactions?

If the answer to this question is yes, proceed with the actions below.

`chkconfig squid on`

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

4.20 Only Enable Kudzu Hardware Detection, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

`kudzu` and `hald/udev` are Red Hat's hardware detection programs, which are normally set to run during system startup. Their functionality detects changes in hardware and, without demanding authentication of any sort, allows the user at the console to configure that hardware. This lack of authentication presents the primary danger – meaning, that any user sitting at the console during a reboot can configure any new devices added to the system, potentially in malicious ways.

This configuration is an unnecessary risk for most sites, with the exception of those that need to allow users to easily make hardware changes without having a root password. Sites in the exception class might need to allow students to connect external hard drives, backup drives or other potentially common external devices.

Even if this rc-script is deactivated, `kudzu` is still accessible. To run `kudzu` after installing new hardware, run `/etc/rc.d/init.d/kudzu start` at the shell prompt while logged in as root.

Another, security benefit would be to limit the runlevels `kudzu` is permitted to function at. Those systems normally operating at runlevel 3, should then only enable `kudzu` at the same runlevel.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Does the site absolutely need to allow users at the console to add hardware to the system?

If the answer to this question is yes, then perform the action below.

```
chkconfig --level 35 kudzu on
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

5 System Network Parameter Tuning

5.1 Network Parameter Modifications

Description:

For an explanation of some of these parameters, see [/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt](#) in the local copy of the kernel source (requires installing the kernel source RPMs); or read the latest from the cross-referencing Linux site:

<http://lxr.linux.no/source/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt>.

For additional insights, consult the following links:

<http://ipsysctl-tutorial.frozentux.net/ipsysctl-tutorial.html>

<http://lwn.net/Articles/45386>

<http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/linux/kernel/653569>

See also SN.9 for additional security-related network tunings to be considered.

- net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 4096

`tcp_max_syn_backlog` specifies the maximum number of incomplete tcp connection requests that will be remembered. When this system is under a syn flood, a larger number will increase its chance of being able to handle legitimate requests.

- net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1

With syncookies enabled, if we reach a point where there are more than 4096 incomplete connections (highly unlikely under normal loads), this system will change how it responds to new connection requests. Instead of remembering all new connections, it sends out a coded response (the "syncookie") and completely forgets that the connection request came in at all. If the client actually completes the connection request with the third ACK packet, the server can see the cookie coming back and can then rebuild the connection in memory. The remaining connection requests (the syn flood packets) will never send this third ACK packet, so the server now has a way to hold legitimate conversations without tying up huge amounts of memory and processor time handling the flood. When syncookies are turned on and we overflow the above backlog, the excess connections are completed, but we lose the ability to use TCP extensions for those connections. This may result in some performance hit for those connections, but the damage here is far less than the damage from the syn flood itself.

- net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1

Arriving packets get a simple check; is the packet arriving on the correct interface for its source address? In other words, would a response to this packet go back out the same interface? This simple routing table check can quickly handle some attempts at spoofing source addresses. The only reason why this might need to be left off is if your network using asymmetric routing. One example might be a satellite link where incoming packets arrive on an ethernet interface, but outgoing packets go out through a modem.

- net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0

This IP option specifies how incoming and outgoing packets get routed. While originally intended as a troubleshooting technique, it is used almost exclusively to exploit IP trust relationships with spoofed source packets, and should be disabled.

- **net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0**

When disabled, this system will no longer accept ICMP Redirect messages. While these can be occasionally be legitimately used to temporarily patch an incorrect routing table on a host machine, malicious hosts can use these to force packets through a sniffer or invalid gateway. For hosts with correct routing tables, this type of packet only has malicious uses. For hosts with incorrect routing tables, ignoring these packets will only slightly impact network performance.

- **net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0**

When enabled, this would allow redirects from local routers. It's disabled for the same reasons as the above; malicious hosts could lie about the source address for the redirect.

- **net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1**

- **net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0**

- **net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0**

- **net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0**

The previous settings (the "**net.ipv4.conf.all.***" settings) affect all interfaces that exist when the change is implemented at boot time. These "**net.ipv4.conf.default.***" make the same changes for any additional interfaces that are created later, such as hotplug USB or PCMCIA network cards.

- **net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1**

When set to ignore, this system will not respond to broadcast pings such as those used in Smurf attacks. The system will continue to respond to normal ping packets, just not participate in creating floods of echo replies.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> /etc/sysctl.conf
# The following 11 lines added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec 5.1:
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 4096
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root /etc/sysctl.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf"
diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

5.2 Additional Network Parameter Modifications

Description:

For an explanation of some of these parameters, see </Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt> in the local copy of the kernel source or read the latest from the cross-referencing Linux site: <http://lxr.linux.no/source/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt>.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this system going to be used as a firewall or gateway to pass network traffic between different networks?

If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.

```
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> /etc/sysctl.conf
# The following 04 lines added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec 5.2:
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root /etc/sysctl.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf"
      diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

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6 Logging

The items in this section cover enabling various different forms of system logging in order to keep track of activity on the system. Because it is often necessary to correlate log information from many different systems (particularly after a security incident) experts recommend establishing some form of time synchronization among systems and devices connected to the local network. The standard Internet protocol for time synchronization is the Network Time Protocol (NTP), which is supported by most network-ready devices. More information on NTP can be found at <http://www.ntp.org> and http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/Linux/docs/HOWTO/otherformats/html_single/TimePrecision-HOWTO.html.

6.1 Capture Messages Sent To syslog AUTHPRIV Facility

Description:

A great deal of important security-related information is sent via logging channels (e.g., network service startups, commands like `usermod` and `chage`, etc). The below action causes this information to be captured in the `/var/log/secure` file (which is only readable by the superuser). This file should be reviewed and archived on a regular basis.

The priority, within `syslog.conf` is one of the following words, in ascending order: `debug`, `info`, `notice`, `warning`, `warn` (same as `warning`), `error`, `err` (same as `error`), `crit`, `alert`, `emerg`, and `panic` (same as `emerg`).

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
if [ `grep -v '^#' /etc/syslog.conf | grep -c 'authpriv'` -eq 0 ]; then
    echo "Established the following record in /etc/syslog.conf"
    echo "authpriv.*\t\t\t\t/var/log/secure"
    echo -e "authpriv.*\t\t\t\t/var/log/secure" >> /etc/syslog.conf
else
    echo "syslog OK.  Didn't have to change syslog.conf for authpriv; the"
    echo "following record is good:"
    grep "^authpriv" /etc/syslog.conf | grep '/var/log/secure'
fi
# Add record for 'auth.*', too, placing it after the authpriv record
if [ `grep -v '^#' /etc/syslog.conf | grep -c 'auth.\*'` -eq 0 ]; then
    ed /etc/syslog.conf <<END_SCRIPT
1
/^authpriv
a
auth.*                                /var/log/messages
.
w
q
END_SCRIPT
else
    echo "syslog OK.  Didn't have to change syslog.conf for auth.*; the"
    echo "following record is good:"
    grep 'auth.\*' /etc/syslog.conf
fi
chown root:root /etc/syslog.conf
# Original/default permissions are 0644.
chmod 0600 /etc/syslog.conf
echo "diff /etc/syslog.conf-preCIS /etc/syslog.conf"
```

```
diff /etc/syslog.conf-preCIS /etc/syslog.conf
# Create the log file if it doesn't already exist.
touch /var/log/secure
chown root:root /var/log/secure
chmod 0600 /var/log/secure
echo "Restarting syslog service to immediately implement the latest configuration."
service syslog stop
service syslog start
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

6.2 Turn On Additional Logging For FTP Daemon

Description:

Red Hat Enterprise Linux already logs connections and all files transferred in vsftpd. The modifications below ensure all commands sent to the server are logged.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
FILE=""
if [ -f /etc/vsftpd.conf ]; then
    FILE="/etc/vsftpd.conf"
else
    FILE="/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf"
fi
if [ -f $FILE ]; then
    awk '/^#?xferlog_std_format/ \
        { print "xferlog_std_format=NO"; next };
/^#?log_ftp_protocol/ \
        { print "log_ftp_protocol=YES"; next };
{ print }' ${FILE}-preCIS > ${FILE}
    if [ `egrep -c log_ftp_protocol ${FILE}` == 0 ]; then
        echo "log_ftp_protocol=YES" >> ${FILE}
    fi
    chown root:root $FILE
    chmod 0600 $FILE
    echo "diff ${FILE}-preCIS $FILE"
    diff ${FILE}-preCIS $FILE
else
    echo "OK - No /etc/vsftpd.conf."
fi
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

6.3 Confirm Permissions On System Log Files

Description:

It is critical to protect system log files from being modified by unauthorized individuals. Also, certain logs contain sensitive data that should only be available to the system administrator.

If any of the services that affect the below logs are required, please revisit this section to ensure the logs have the correct/secure permissions.

Note: The `chmod` command will display errors, when the file does not exist.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
#echo "Some errors MAY appear here for directories, logs and/or files not
installed on this system."
```

```
cd /var/log
```

```
# Part 1
```

```
echo "Extra---Ensure the btmp log file for 'lastb' is in place and with proper"
```

```
echo "      permissions. This satisfies DISA SRR (GEN000440)"
```

```
touch /var/log/btmp
```

```
chown root:root /var/log/btmp
```

```
chmod 0600 /var/log/btmp
```

```
echo "Before listing of the log directory [explicit]."
```

```
ls -la /var/log
```

```
# Part 2
```

```
echo "LogPerms Part 1."
```

```
for LogFile in \
```

```
boot.log \
```

```
btmp \
```

```
cron \
```

```
dmesg \
```

```
ksyms \
```

```
httpd \
```

```
lastlog \
```

```
maillog \
```

```
mailman \
```

```
messages \
```

```
news \
```

```
pgsql \
```

```
rpmpkgs \
```

```
sa \
```

```
samba \
```

```
scrollkeeper.log \
```

```
secure \
```

```
spooler \
```

```
squid \
```

```
vbox \
```

```
wtmp
```

```
do
```

```
# This check allows only entries that exist to have permissions set.
```

```
# Visually cleaner for the person running it.
```

```
if [ -e ${LogFile} ]; then
```

```
    # Utilizing recursive here is harmless when applied to a single file.
```

```

        chmod -R o-rwx ${LogFile}*
    else
        echo "LogFile didn't exist (${LogFile})."
    fi
done
echo "LogPerms Part 2."
for LogFile in \
boot.log          \
cron              \
dmesg            \
gdm              \
httpd            \
ksyms            \
lastlog          \
maillog          \
mailman          \
messages         \
news             \
pgsql            \
rpmpkgs          \
samba            \
sa               \
scrollkeeper.log \
secure           \
spooler          \
squid            \
vbox
do
    if [ -e ${LogFile} ]; then
        chmod -R g-w ${LogFile}*
    else
        echo "LogFile didn't exist (${LogFile})."
    fi
done

echo "LogPerms Part 3."
for LogFile in \
boot.log          \
cron              \
httpd            \
lastlog          \
maillog          \
mailman          \
messages         \
pgsql            \
sa               \
samba            \
secure           \
spooler
do
    if [ -e ${LogFile} ]; then
        chmod -R g-rx ${LogFile}*
    else
        echo "LogFile didn't exist (${LogFile})."
    fi
done

echo "LogPerms Part 4."
for LogFile in \

```



```

gdm          \
httpd        \
news         \
samba        \
squid        \
sa           \
vbox
do
  if [ -e ${LogFile} ]; then
    chmod -R o-w ${LogFile}*
  else
    echo "LogFile didn't exist (${LogFile})."
  fi
done

echo "LogPerms Part 5."
for LogFile in \
httpd          \
samba          \
squid          \
sa
do
  if [ -e ${LogFile} ]; then
    chmod -R o-rx ${LogFile}*
  else
    echo "LogFile didn't exist (${LogFile})."
  fi
done

echo "LogPerms Part 6."
for LogFile in \
kernel         \
lastlog        \
mailman        \
syslog         \
loginlog
do
  if [ -e ${LogFile} ]; then
    chmod -R u-x ${LogFile}*
  else
    echo "LogFile didn't exist (${LogFile})."
  fi
done

echo "LogPerms Part 7."
# Removing group write permissions to btmp and wtmp
chgrp utmp btmp
chmod g-w btmp
chgrp utmp wtmp
chmod g-w wtmp

# Fixing "/etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit", as it unsecures permissions for wtmp.
awk '( $1 == "chmod" && $2 == "0664" && $3 == "/var/run/utmp" && $4 ==
"/var/log/wtmp" ) {
  print "chmod 0600 /var/run/utmp /var/log/wtmp"; next };
( $1 == "chmod" && $2 == "0664" && $3 == "/var/run/utmpx" && $4 ==
"/var/log/wtmpx" ) {
  print "  chmod 0600 /var/run/utmpx /var/log/wtmpx"; next };
{ print }' /etc/rc.d-preCIS/rc.sysinit > /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit

```

```
chown root:root /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit

chmod 0700 /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit
echo "diff /etc/rc.d-preCIS/rc.sysinit /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit"
    diff /etc/rc.d-preCIS/rc.sysinit /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit

echo "LogPerms Part 8."
[ -e news ]    && chown -R news:news news
[ -e pgsql ]   && chown postgres:postgres pgsql
[ -e squid ]   && chown -R squid:squid squid
[ -e lastlog ] && chmod 0600 lastlog
chown -R root:root .
echo ""

echo "Follow-on listing of the log directory [explicit]."
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

6.4 Configure syslogd to Send Logs to a Remote LogHost

Description:

Remote logging is essential in detecting intrusion and monitoring several servers operating in concert. An intruder – once he/she has obtained root – can edit the system logs to remove all traces of the attack. If the logs are stored off the machine, those logs can be analyzed for anomalies and used for prosecuting the attacker.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

In the script below, replace loghost with the proper name (FQDN, if necessary) of the loghost.

```
printf "Following 05 lines added per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec 6.4 \
    RHEL Benchmark Section 6.4\n \
    kern.warning;*.err;authpriv.none\t@loghost\n \
    *.info;mail.none;authpriv.none;cron.none\t@loghost\n \
    *.emerg\t@loghost\n \
    local7.*\t@loghost\n " >> /etc/syslog.conf
chown root:root /etc/syslog.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/syslog.conf
echo "diff /etc/syslog.conf-preCIS /etc/syslog.conf"
    diff /etc/syslog.conf-preCIS /etc/syslog.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7 File and Directory Permissions/Access

7.1 Add 'nodev' Option To Appropriate Partitions In /etc/fstab

Description:

Placing "nodev" on these partitions prevents non-administrative users from mounting unauthorized devices on any partitions that should not contain devices. There should be little need to mount devices on any partitions other than device entries established subordinate to /dev.

One notable exception, of course, is the case where system programs are being placed into "chroot jails" - these often require that several devices be created in the chroot directory. If using chroot jails on any of the machines, be careful with the nodev option.

Configuring filesystems to prevent abuse is an important step in securing a system. Where feasible filesystems should be mounted with the most restrictive set of permissions possible that still allows normal operation. The three most important restrictions are nodev (prevent devices from being created on this filesystem), nosuid (do not respect the suid bit on this filesystem) and noexec (do no execute files from this filesystem).

At a minimum the nodev option should be applied to all filesystems except / to prevent users from mounting unauthorized devices. There should be little need to mount devices on any filesystems other than /dev.

Note: The printf command may cause unexpected concatenation of fields, when one of them is too long.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
awk '( $3 ~ /^ext[23]$/ && $2 != "/" ) { $4 = $4 ",nodev" }; \
  { printf "%-26s%-22s%-8s%-16s %-1s %-1s\n", $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6 }' \
  /etc/fstab > /tmp/cis/fstab.tmp2
#       Kept /tmp/cis/fstab.tmp2 as input to the next step (CIS 7.2).
chown root:root /etc/fstab
chmod 0644 /etc/fstab
# Note: the diff IS not for the same pair of files, as this step is treated
# as intermediary. But, we'll show the users the damage done so far and
# they see the progress.
echo "diff /etc/fstab-preCIS /etc/fstab"
diff /etc/fstab /tmp/cis/fstab.tmp2
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.2 Add 'nosuid' and 'nodev' Option For Removable Media In /etc/fstab

Description:

Removable media is one vector by which malicious software can be introduced onto the system. By forcing these file systems to be mounted with appropriate secure options, the administrator prevents users from bringing hostile programs onto the system via CDROMs, floppy disks, USB drives, etc.

Generally, many usb devices can be implemented and the OS will ignore settings in 'console.perms'. Therefore, the only solid way of preventing usb drives from mounting is via udev. On some Linux systems all mountable devices may be handled by /etc/fstab. In this case the instructions for securing removable file systems are the same as in Section 7.1, the `nodev`, `nosuid` and optionally the `noexec` option should be added to each entry for a removable device in /etc/fstab.

RHEL 5 uses `udev` and the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) daemon software to update the filesystem description table (/etc/fstab) based on a series of SGML policies located in /usr/share/hal/fdi. Editing these SHML files manually is beyond the scope of this Benchmark. Therefore, if changes are made to /etc/fstab, set it to be immutable (via `chattr`, check the `man` page). It is not required, though, for the immutable bit to be set, to be Benchmark compliant.

Some clarification on RHEL 5 behavior: because the action has changed significantly from RHEL 4. In RHEL 5 `udev` and `hal` cooperatively interact to mount inserted removable media. The policies governing the mounting come from a combination of the `udev` and `hal` config files. `udev`'s primary contribution is to create the device node, set device permissions and alert `hal`. `hal` executes the mount after referencing it's rules list. `hal` uses the `/usr/libexec/hal-storage-mount` program to perform the mount.

RHEL 5, by default, does the "right thing" when mounting removable media (mounts with `nodev`, `nosuid` and `noexec` options), however, auditing the behavior can be a challenge. The default mount options that are applied to all removable media mounts do not appear in any of the `hal` rules files. The reason is that the mount options are coded into the `/usr/libexec/hal-storage-mount` program that executes the mount (review the source, or run `strings` on the binary and see the mount options "noexec, nosuid, nodev"). It appears that unless the mount option is specifically allowed for a given media type in the `20-storage-methods.fdi` file then an unprivileged user cannot mount with that mount option. Therefore, since there does not appear to be any allowed mount options in the stock file to allow the overriding of the `nodev` and `nosuid` options it should be impossible for an unprivileged user to mount a device, even with `suid` or `dev` support.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# Part 1
# Additional devices this section 'might' consider could be a DVD or cd recorder
awk '( $2 ~ /^\/m.*\/(floppy|cdrom|corder)$/ ) && ( $4 !~ /,nodev,nosuid/ ) \
  { $4 = $4 ",nodev,nosuid" }; \
  { printf "%-26s%-22s%-8s%-16s %-1s %-1s\n", $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6 }' \
  /tmp/cis/fstab.tmp2 > /tmp/cis/fstab.tmp3
mv /tmp/cis/fstab.tmp3 /etc/fstab
chown root:root /etc/fstab
chmod 0644 /etc/fstab
echo "diff /etc/fstab-preCIS /etc/fstab"
```

```
diff /etc/fstab-preCIS /etc/fstab
echo "This hardening procedure will NOT set /etc/fstab immutable, (contrary to the
Benchmark)"
echo "    since the HAL daemon manages portions of it."
echo "#    /usr/bin/chattr +i    /etc/fstab"

# Part 2
fdiPATH='unknown'
if [ -e /usr/share/hal/fdi/95userpolicy ]; then
    # Apply this to RHEL AS4 system
    fdiPATH="/usr/share/hal/fdi/95userpolicy"
else
    if [ -e /usr/share/hal/fdi/policy/20thirdparty ]; then
        # apply this for RHEL5
        fdiPATH="/usr/share/hal/fdi/policy/20thirdparty"
    fi
fi
if [ "$fdiPATH" == 'unknown' ]; then
    echo "Neither path was available, fdi for hal NOT secured."
    echo "RHEL AS4: /usr/share/hal/fdi/95userpolicy"
    echo "RHEL5:    /usr/share/hal/fdi/policy/20thirdparty"
else
    echo "Placing floppycdrom.fdi at: ($fdiPATH)."
    cat <<END_SCRIPT >> $fdiPATH/floppycdrom.fdi
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> <!-- -*- SGML -*- -->
<deviceinfo version="0.2">
  <!-- Default policies merged onto computer root object -->
  <device>
    <match key="info.udi" string="/org/freedesktop/Hal/devices/computer">
      <merge key="storage.policy.default.mount_option.nodev"
type="bool">true</merge>
      <merge key="storage.policy.default.mount_option.nosuid"
type="bool">true</merge>
    </match>
  </device>
</deviceinfo>
END_SCRIPT
    chown root:root    $fdiPATH/floppycdrom.fdi
    chmod 0640        $fdiPATH/floppycdrom.fdi
    echo "Established $fdiPATH/floppycdrom.fdi"
fi
```

Additional *Optional* Action for RHEL5 is to set the immutable bit on the fstab file. However, this is not a mandatory hardening action, as `hal` normally manages this file and expects to be able to update it dynamically as the need arises. Use with caution, and watch the syslog messages file for errors.

```
# USE with caution:
chattr +i /etc/fstab
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.3 Disable User-Mounted Removable File Systems

Description:

In Red Hat Enterprise Linux, the pam_console PAM module gives the user at the console (the machine's true physical keyboard) temporarily enhanced privileges. This is configured through the `/etc/security/console.perms` file or `console.perms.d/50-default.perms`. Under the Red Hat-shipped settings, the console user is given ownership of the floppy and CD-ROM drive, along with a host of other devices.

Many of these devices correspond to removable media and thus represent a security risk. This item disables the enhanced privileges on these devices. Be aware that allowing users to mount and access data from removable media drives makes it easier for malicious programs and data to be imported onto the network or data to be removed from the server.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason to allow unprivileged users to mount CD-ROMs and floppy disk file systems on this system? If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below.

```
cd /etc/security
CONS_PERM_FILE="console.perms"
DEF_FILE="console.perms.d/50-default.perms"
# If the test below passes, the 2nd file is changed, not the first.
# Need to protect both.
test -f $DEF_FILE && CONS_PERM_FILE="$DEF_FILE"
# Each entry listed below will NOT be commented out in the "console.perms" file.
# The remaining entries in that file WILL be commented out and thus disabled
# post-reboot.
# Further, "memstick" and "diskonkey" were not part of the original CIS
# specification to be left alone, but have been included to tailor the hardened
# build for usage of normal system USB requirements (such as keyboards and mice).
awk '( $1 == "<console>" ) && ( $3 !~
/sound|fb|kbd|joystick|v4l|mainboard|gpm|scanner|memstick|diskonkey/ ) \
{ $1 = "#<console>" }; { print }' ${CONS_PERM_FILE}-preCIS > $CONS_PERM_FILE
# Virgin default permissions were 0644 & 0600 respectively... Just noting the
difference.
chown root:root $CONS_PERM_FILE
chmod 0600 $CONS_PERM_FILE
echo "diff ${CONS_PERM_FILE}-preCIS $CONS_PERM_FILE"
diff ${CONS_PERM_FILE}-preCIS $CONS_PERM_FILE
cd $cishome
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.4 Verify passwd, shadow, and group File Permissions

Description:

These are the default owners and access permissions for these files. It is worthwhile to periodically check these file permissions as there have been package defects that changed `/etc/shadow` permissions to 0644. Tripwire (<http://www.tripwire.org/downloads/index.php>) though it hasn't been updated since 2001, AIDE (<http://sourceforge.net/projects/aide>) – a successor to Tripwire, and zlister (<http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/linux/system/admin/zlisterProduction-1.7a>) are excellent products for alerting to changes in these files, and others throughout the filesystem.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
ls -la /etc/group /etc/gshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow

chown root:root /etc/group /etc/gshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow
chmod 0644 /etc/group /etc/passwd
chmod 0400 /etc/gshadow /etc/shadow

ls -la /etc/group /etc/gshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.5 Ensure World-Writable Directories Have Their Sticky Bit Set

Description:

When the so-called "sticky bit" is set on a directory, then only the owner of a file may remove that file from the directory (as opposed to the usual behavior where anybody with write access to that directory may remove the file). Setting the sticky bit prevents users from overwriting each other's files, whether accidentally or maliciously, and is generally appropriate for most world-writable directories.

However, consult appropriate vendor documentation before blindly applying the sticky bit to any world writable directories found in order to avoid breaking any application dependencies on a given directory. Alternatively, ensure such directories are not world-writable.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

The automated tool supplied with this Benchmark will flag world-writable directories that do not have the sticky bit set.

Administrators who wish to obtain a list of these directories may execute the following commands:

```
for PART in `awk '( $3 ~ "ext[23]" ) { print $2 }' /etc/fstab`;
do
    find $PART -xdev -type d \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) -print
done
```

There should be no entries returned.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.6 Find Unauthorized World-Writable Files

Description:

Data in world-writable files can be modified and compromised by any user on the system. World-writable files may also indicate an incorrectly written script or program that could potentially be the cause of a larger compromise to the system's integrity.

Generally removing write access for the "other" category (`chmod o-w <filename>`) is advisable, but always consult relevant vendor documentation in order to avoid breaking any application dependencies on a given file.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

The CIS-CAT automated testing tool supplied as a companion to this Benchmark will flag unexpected world-writable files on local system partitions.

Administrators who wish to obtain a list of the world-writable files currently installed on the system may run the following commands to identify them:

```
for PART in $( grep -v '^#' /etc/fstab | awk '( $3 ~ "ext[23]" ) { print $2 }' );
do
    find $PART -xdev -type f \( -perm -0002 -a ! -perm -1000 \) -print
done
```

There should be no entries returned. If `grub.conf` shows up, its permissions will be adjusted in section 8.8.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.7 Find Unauthorized SUID/SGID System Executables

Description:

The administrator should take care to ensure that no rogue or inappropriate set-UID programs/scripts have been introduced into the system. In addition, if possible, the administrator should accomplish a set-UID audit and reduction/elimination of those unnecessary to the systems functioning

The script below has the list of those binaries/scripts which come by default in the distributed OS as having SUID (- --s --- ---) and/or GUID (- --- --s ---) enabled.

All users primary group should be their user private group they are then granted membership in other groups as needed. Depending on the level of group interaction and security/integrity requirements of the documents all users are then set with an 007 or 027 default umask. File sharing spaces are designated by creating a folder owned by the group with the SGID bit set. This causes all files placed in that folder to assume the group ownership of the folder regardless of the primary group of the creator. Ex. Jane, a member of the accounting group, creates a spreadsheet. The permissions on the spreadsheet in her home folder are `jane:jane 0640`. She then moves the file to the "accounting" folder which has permissions `root:accounting 4770`. The spreadsheet's new permissions should be `jane:accounting 0640`.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

The automated testing tool supplied with this Benchmark will flag unexpected set-UID and set-GID applications on the system. Administrators who wish to obtain a list of the set-UID and set-GID programs currently installed on the system may run the following commands:

```
# Part1
echo "Generate list of SUID/SGID files that exist on the system..."
for PART in $( grep -v '^#' /etc/fstab | awk '($3 ~ "ext[23]" ) { print $2 }' );
do
    find $PART -xdev \( -perm -04000 -o -perm -02000 \) -print | sort \
        >> /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f1
done

# Part2
for FILE in \
    /bin/mount \
    /bin/ping \
    /bin/ping6 \
    /bin/su \
    /bin/traceroute \
    /bin/traceroute6 \
    /bin/umount \
    /media/.hal-mtab-lock \
    /sbin/mount.nfs \
    /sbin/mount.nfs4 \
    /sbin/netreport \
    /sbin/pam_timestamp_check \
    /sbin/pwdb_chkpwd \
    /sbin/umount.nfs \
    /sbin/umount.nfs4 \
    /sbin/unix_chkpwd \
    /usr/X11R6/bin/Xorg \
    /usr/bin/at \
    /usr/bin/chage \
    /usr/bin/chfn \
    /usr/bin/chsh \
    /usr/bin/crontab \
    /usr/bin/cu \
    /usr/bin/gataxx \
    /usr/bin/glines \
    /usr/bin/gnibbles \
    /usr/bin/gnobot2 \
    /usr/bin/gnomine \
```

```

/usr/bin/gnotravex \
/usr/bin/gnotski \
/usr/bin/gpasswd \
/usr/bin/gtali \
/usr/bin/iagno \
/usr/bin/kgrantpty \
/usr/bin/kon \
/usr/bin/kpac_dhcp_helper \
/usr/bin/locate \
/usr/bin/lockfile \
/usr/bin/lppasswd \
/usr/bin/mahjongg \
/usr/bin/newgrp \
/usr/bin/newvc \
/usr/bin/passwd \
/usr/bin/rcp \
/usr/bin/rlogin \
/usr/bin/rsh \
/usr/bin/same-gnome \
/usr/bin/screen \
/usr/bin/sg \
/usr/bin/slocate \
/usr/bin/sperl5.8.5 \
/usr/bin/ssh-agent \
/usr/bin/sudo \
/usr/bin/sudoedit \
/usr/bin/uucp \
/usr/bin/uuname \
/usr/bin/uuname \
/usr/bin/uustat \
/usr/bin/uux \
/usr/bin/wall \
/usr/bin/write \
/usr/bin/xterm \
/usr/kerberos/bin/ksu \
/usr/lib/amanda/amqde \
/usr/lib/amanda/calcsite \
/usr/lib/amanda/dumper \
/usr/lib/amanda/killpgrp \
/usr/lib/amanda/planner \
/usr/lib/amanda/rundump \
/usr/lib/amanda/runtar \
/usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/deliver \
/usr/lib/mc/cons.saver \
/usr/lib/mgetty+sendfax/faxq-helper \
/usr/lib/news/bin/inndstart \
/usr/lib/news/bin/rnews \
/usr/lib/news/bin/startinnfeed \
/usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper \
/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign \
/usr/libexec/pt_chown \
/usr/libexec/utempter/utempter \
/usr/lib64/vte/gnome-pty-helper \
/usr/bin/locate \
/usr/bin/screen \
/usr/bin/Xorg \
/usr/lib/squid/ncsa_auth \
/usr/lib/squid/pam_auth \
/usr/libexec/libvirt_proxy \

```

```
/usr/libexec/mc/cons.saver      \  
/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign  \  
/usr/libexec/utempter/utempter  \  
/usr/sbin/amcheck              \  
/usr/sbin/ccreds_validate       \  
/usr/sbin/exim                  \  
/usr/sbin/gnome-pty-helper      \  
/usr/sbin/lockdev               \  
/usr/sbin/postdrop              \  
/usr/sbin/postqueue             \  
/usr/sbin/sendmail.sendmail     \  
/usr/sbin/suexec                 \  
/usr/sbin/userhelper            \  
/usr/sbin/userisdntcl           \  
/usr/sbin/usernetctl            \  
/usr/sbin/utempter              \  
/usr/sbin/uucico                 \  
/usr/sbin/uuxqt                  \  
/usr/sbin/utempter
```

```
do  
  # Valid files with either SUID or SGID set are listed above, so this  
  # next piece will remove them from what's been found.  
  grep -v ${FILE} /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f1 > /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f2  
  # Put the file back and continue searching  
  /bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f2 /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f1  
done  
x=`wc -c /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f1 | cut -d" " -f1`  
if [ $x == 0 ]; then  
  echo "($x) OK - No inappropriate SUID or SGID files found."  
else  
  sed 's/^.*\/ls -lad &/' /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f1 > /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f2  
  echo "The following files have either the SUID and/or the SGID bit set."  
  echo "These are not in the list of approved files/executables to have either"  
  echo "of those bits set. Recommend removing the SUID/SGID bits on them."  
  /bin/bash /tmp/cis/CIS_7.7_f2  
fi
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.8 Find All Unowned Directories and Files

Description:

Investigate and do not allow any unowned directories and/or files on the system. Unowned entities may be an indication an intruder has accessed the system or improper package maintenance or installation. Sometimes a package removal results in unowned files or directories related to this software as the user/group associated with that package is removed, but that user's files (i.e., files changed after the package was installed) are left behind.

When users are removed from the system, a check for unowned directories and files should occur at that time, so that someone responsible for such information (programs, data, etc...) can rightfully assume ownership.

Another common cause is the installation of software that does not properly set file ownerships. Files in any NFS mounts should be investigated/researched as the user ID mapping between systems may be out of sync. If the local Enterprise uses a central user management system (NIS or LDAP), the presence of unowned files may indicate some other problem and should be investigated.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
for PART in $(grep -v '^#' /etc/fstab | awk '( $3 ~ "ext[23]" ) { print $2 }' );
do
    find $PART -xdev -nouser -o -nogroup -print > /tmp/cis/CIS_7.8_f1
done
sed 's/^.*\/ls -lad &/' /tmp/cis/CIS_7.8_f1 > /tmp/cis/CIS_7.8_f2
cat /tmp/cis/CIS_7.8_f2
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
```

There should be no entries returned.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

7.9 Disable USB Devices

Description:

USB drives and memory devices represent another attack vector against a system. The prices for a 1GB USB memory device, or larger, have become very affordable, and is enough storage to transport vast quantities of data off a system. Few servers have need for USB devices and this whole avenue should be disabled.

Another possible attack would be to have a bootable Linux system installed on the USB device. Most modern BIOS' allow booting from USB devices, so this would let a person with physical access to a server an extremely easy way take over a system and bypass some of the security being set up. See the discussion regarding floppy and CD-ROM drives in section 7.2.

For these reasons, should also disable USB in the system BIOS if possible.

Note: Hotplugger is required by `udev`, which is required by several other required packages, making very unlikely to be able to remove it. Therefore, for new Red Hat versions the `nousb` kernel boot argument should be employed to disable USB devices. The script below uses `grubby` to add the `nousb` kernel boot argument to the default kernel image. Adding `nousb` to other kernel images is also recommended. The `/etc/grub.conf` symbolic link may also be viewed or

edited as well. The `nousb` argument is placed at the end of the lines starting with `kernel`, as shown below.

```
kernel /vmlinuz-2.6.xx_FC5 ro root=LABEL=/ nousb
```

The "`nousb`" argument to the kernel may also disable USB keyboards and mice. A potentially serious problem on legacy free systems that do not have PS2 connections or for systems using USB KVMs. An alternative remediation would be to insert the line "`install usb-storage /bin/true`" into `/etc/modprobe.conf`. This will disable USB storage devices by preventing the kernel module from loading".

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
DEF_KERN=$( grubby --default-kernel)
grubby --update-kernel=$DEF_KERN --args="nousb"
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

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8 System Access, Authentication, and Authorization

8.1 Remove .rhosts Support In PAM Configuration Files

Description:

Used in conjunction with the BSD-style "r-commands" (`rlogin`, `rsh`, `rcp`), the `.rhosts` files implement a *weak* form of authentication based on the network address or host name of the remote computer (which can be spoofed by a potential attacker to exploit the local system). Disabling `.rhosts` support helps prevent users from subverting the system's normal access control mechanisms. On an RHEL5.1 system, PAM documentation can be found under `"/usr/share/doc/pam-0.99.7.1/txts`.

If `.rhosts` support is required for some reason, some basic precautions should be taken when creating and managing `.rhosts` files. Never use the "+" wildcard character in `.rhosts` files. In fact, `.rhosts` entries should always specify a specific trusted host name along with the user name of the trusted account on that system (e.g., "trustedhost alice" and not just "trustedhost"). Avoid establishing trust relationships with systems outside of the organization's security perimeter and/or systems not controlled by the local administrative staff. Firewalls and other network security elements should actually block `rlogin/rsh/rcp` access from external hosts.

Finally, make sure that `.rhosts` files are only readable by the owner of the file (i.e., these files should be mode `0600`).

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
ls -la /etc/pam.d/* > /tmp/cis/CIS_7.1.Before.tmp
cd /etc/pam.d
for FILE in `find . -type f -exec grep -l rhosts_auth {} \;`; do
    echo "Removing .rhosts support in ${FILE}."
    grep -v rhosts_auth $FILE > /tmp/cis/${FILE}.tmp
    /bin/cp -f /tmp/cis/${FILE}.tmp $FILE
    chown root:root $FILE
    chmod 0644 $FILE
done
ls -la /etc/pam.d/* > /tmp/cis/CIS_7.1.After.tmp
echo "The following entries changed under '/etc/pam.d'"
echo "diff /tmp/cis/CIS_7.1.Before.tmp /tmp/cis/CIS_7.1.After.tmp"
    diff /tmp/cis/CIS_7.1.Before.tmp /tmp/cis/CIS_7.1.After.tmp
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
cd $cishome
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.2 Create ftpusers Files

Description:

`/etc/ftpusers` and `/etc/vsftpd.ftpusers` contain a list of users who are not allowed to access the system via WU-FTPd and vsftpd, respectively. Generally, only normal users should ever access the system via FTP—there should be no reason for "system" type accounts to be transferring information via this mechanism. Certainly the root account should never be allowed to transfer files directly via FTP.

If `vsftpd` is used, it may be desirable to reverse the usage of the users file to be a list of users who ARE able to ftp to the server, instead of a list of users who are NOT able to ftp into the server. This provides greater control and safety in denying the ftp usage by default for users NOT listed. To reverse the meaning of the `vsftpd` users list file set `userlist_deny=NO` in the `vsftpd.conf` file. The script below attempts to check for the `userlist_deny vsftpd` setting and will not create or modify the default `vsftpd` user list file if the value is NO. It is important to carefully test the configuration after these changes to be sure that only the expected users are allowed to login via ftp.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
if [ -f /etc/ftpaccess ]; then
  for NAME in `cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd`; do
    if [ `id -u $NAME` -lt 500 ]; then
      echo $NAME >> /etc/ftpusers
    fi
  done
  chown root:root /etc/ftpusers
  chmod 0600 /etc/ftpusers
  echo "diff /etc/ftpusers-preCIS /etc/ftpusers"
  diff /etc/ftpusers-preCIS /etc/ftpusers

  VSFTP_CONF="/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf"
  ALT_CONF="/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf"
  test -f $ALT_CONF && VSFTP_CONF=$ALT_CONF
  if [ -e $VSFTP_CONF ] && ! grep -q "^userlist_deny=NO" $VSFTP_CONF; then
    /bin/cp -fp /etc/ftpusers /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers
    chown root:root /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf
    chgrp 0600 /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf
    [ -e /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers-preCIS ] && echo "diff /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers-
preCIS /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers"
    [ -e /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers-preCIS ] && diff /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers-
preCIS /etc/vsftpd.ftpusers
  fi
else
  echo "OK - No /etc/ftpaccess to tailor."
fi
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.3 Prevent X Server From Listening On Port 6000/tcp

Description:

X servers listen on port 6000/tcp for messages from remote clients running on other systems. However, X Windows uses a relatively insecure authentication protocol and an attacker who is able to gain unauthorized access to the local X server can easily compromise the system.

Invoking the "-nolisten tcp" option causes the X server not to listen on port 6000/tcp by default. This prevents authorized remote X clients from displaying windows on the local system as well. However, the forwarding of X events via SSH will still happen normally. This is the preferred and more secure method transmitting results from remote X clients in any event.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
if [ -e /etc/X11/xdm/Xservers ]; then
  cd /etc/X11/xdm
  awk '( $1 !~ /^#/ && $3 == "/usr/X11R6/bin/X" ) { $3 = $3 " -nolisten tcp" } ;
  { print }' Xservers-preCIS > Xservers
  chown root:root Xservers
  chmod 0444      Xservers
  echo "diff Xservers-preCIS Xservers"
      diff Xservers-preCIS Xservers
  cd $cishome
else
  echo "No /etc/X11/xdm/Xservers file to secure."
fi
if [ -d /etc/X11/xinit ]; then
  cd /etc/X11/xinit
  if [ -e xserverrc ]; then
    echo "Fixing /etc/X11/xinit/xserverrc"
    awk '/X/ && !/^#/ { print $0 " :0 -nolisten tcp \\\$@"; next } ; \
    { print }' xserverrc-preCIS > xserverrc
  else
    cat <<END_SCRIPT > xserverrc
#!/bin/bash
exec X :0 -nolisten tcp \\\$@
END_SCRIPT
  fi
  chown root:root xserverrc
  chmod 0755      xserverrc
  [ -e xserverrc-preCIS ] && echo "diff xserverrc-preCIS xserverrc"
  [ -e xserverrc-preCIS ] &&      diff xserverrc-preCIS xserverrc
  cd $cishome
else
  echo "No /etc/X11/xinit file to secure."
fi
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.4 Restrict at/cron To Authorized Users

Description:

The cron.allow and at.allow files are a list of users who are allowed to run the `crontab` and `at` commands to submit jobs to be run at scheduled intervals. On many systems, only the system administrator needs the ability to schedule jobs.

Note: Even though a given user is not listed in `cron.allow`, cron jobs can still be run as that user. `cron.allow` only controls administrative access to the `crontab` command for scheduling and modifying cron jobs.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# With x.allow only users listed can use 'at' or 'cron'
# {where 'x' indicates either 'at' or 'cron'}
# Without x.allow then x.deny is checked, members of x.deny are excluded
# Without either (x.allow and x.deny), then only root can use 'at' and 'cron'
# At a minimum x.allow should exist and list root
echo "Attempting to list the following files for the 'before' picture."
echo "Any 'errors' are alright, as we are simply looking to see what exists."
ls -la /etc/at.allow /etc/at.deny /etc/cron.allow /etc/cron.deny
rm -f /etc/at.deny /etc/cron.deny
echo root > /etc/at.allow
echo root > /etc/cron.allow
chown root:root /etc/at.allow /etc/cron.allow
chmod 0400 /etc/at.allow /etc/cron.allow
if [ -e /etc/at.allow-preCIS ]; then
    echo "diff /etc/at.allow-preCIS /etc/at.allow"
    diff /etc/at.allow-preCIS /etc/at.allow
fi
if [ -e /etc/cron.allow-preCIS ]; then
    echo "diff /etc/cron.allow-preCIS /etc/cron.allow"
    diff /etc/cron.allow-preCIS /etc/cron.allow
fi
echo "Listing the state of these AFTER imposing restrictions..."
echo "Missing file 'errors' are ok here too."
ls -la /etc/at.allow /etc/at.deny /etc/cron.allow /etc/cron.deny
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.5 Restrict Permissions On crontab Files

Description:

The system `crontab` files are accessed only by the `cron` daemon (which runs with superuser privileges) and the `crontab` command (which is set-UID to root). Allowing unprivileged users to read or (even worse) modify system `crontab` files can create the potential for a local user on the system to gain elevated privileges.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
ls -lad /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron*
chown root:root /etc/crontab
chmod 0400 /etc/crontab
chown -R root:root /var/spool/cron
chmod -R go-rwx /var/spool/cron
cd /etc
ls | grep cron | grep -v preCIS | xargs chown -R root:root
ls | grep cron | grep -v preCIS | xargs chmod -R go-rwx
cd $cishome
# What about permissions for the following:
# drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 2 2006 /etc/cron.d
# drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 2 2006 /etc/cron.daily
# -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Aug 2 2006 /etc/cron.deny
# drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 2 2006 /etc/cron.hourly
# drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 2 2006 /etc/cron.monthly
# drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 2 2006 /etc/cron.weekly
# -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 Dec 10 2005 /etc/crontab
echo "After..."
ls -lad /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron*
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.6 Restrict Root Logins To System Console

Description:

Anonymous `root` logins should *never* be allowed, except on the system console in emergency situations. At all other times, the administrator should access the system via an unprivileged account and use some authorized mechanism (such as the `su` command, or the freely-available `sudo` package) to gain additional privileges. These mechanisms provide at least some audit trail in the event of problems.

Many Enterprises – who use serial port concentrators to connect to a server in a data center without physically having to use the keyboard – consider the serial port a console. This is in keeping with the Unix server tradition of controlling headless Unix machines using a serial port console. Just like the virtual consoles, this one needs to be strongly protected as well. If this applies to the organization, execute either, or both of these lines, as needs dictate:

```
echo ttyS0 >> /etc/securetty
echo ttyS1 >> /etc/securetty
```

Be advised that doing so will reduce the CIS-CAT Scoring Tool score and reduce the security posture.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```

echo console > /etc/securetty
# These are acceptable for the GUI and runlevel 3, when trimmed down to 6
for i in `seq 1 6`; do
    echo vc/$i >> /etc/securetty
done
#
#### Commented this out to be more secure as it denies root logins to the physical
TEXT console.
#### Additionally, disabling this is in compliance with the DISA STIG, as well.
# Check pg 14 in Hardening Linux for additional safety in the /etc/inittab
file.
# Do we want this as a required argument submitted on the command line?
#
# for i in `seq 1 6`; do
#     echo tty$i >> /etc/securetty
# done
chown root:root /etc/securetty
chmod 0400 /etc/securetty
echo "diff /etc/securetty-preCIS /etc/securetty"
    diff /etc/securetty-preCIS /etc/securetty

# Part 2
# Second modification of gdm.conf, if it exists.
if [ -e /etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf ]; then
    #### There is another file to consider: "/etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf"
    # "AllowRoot=true" should be set to false to prevent root from logging in to
the gdm GUI.
    # "AllowRemoteRoot=true" should be set to false to prevent root logins from
remote systems.
    # Doing this change is supportive of logging in as a regular user and using
'su' to get to root.
    # Before allowing a reboot, ensure at least one account is created for a
SysAdmin type.
    cd /etc/X11/gdm
    /bin/cp -pf gdm.conf /tmp/cis/gdm.conf.tmp
    sed -e 's/AllowRoot=true/AllowRoot=false/' \
        -e 's/AllowRemoteRoot=true/AllowRemoteRoot=false/' \
        -e 's/^#Use24Clock=false/Use24Clock=true/'
/tmp/cis/gdm.conf.tmp > gdm.conf
    chown root:root gdm.conf
    chmod 0644 gdm.conf
    echo "diff gdm.conf-preCIS gdm.conf"
        diff gdm.conf-preCIS gdm.conf
    cd $cishome
else
    echo "No /etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf file to further secure."
fi

# Part 3
echo "The following is only required when a serial console is used for this
server."
echo "Either of these would be added manually post-baseline compliance, depending"
echo "on the COM port the serial cable is physically attached to."
echo "#     echo ttyS0 >> /etc/securetty"
echo "#     echo ttyS1 >> /etc/securetty"
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*

```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.7 Set GRUB Password

Description:

An unprotected GRUB boot loader prompt allows an attacker with physical access to subvert the normal boot process very easily. The action below will allow the system to boot normally, only requiring a password when the anyone attempts to modify the boot process by passing commands to GRUB. Make sure to replace <password> in the actions below with an md5-hashed password (check the [man](#) page for `/sbin/grub-md5-crypt`).

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

1. Add this line to `/etc/grub.conf` before the first uncommented line:

```
password <password>
```

Replace <password> with an md5 encrypted password.

2. Execute the following commands as root:

```
chown root:root /boot/grub/grub.conf
chmod 0600 /boot/grub/grub.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.8 Require Authentication For Single-User Mode

Description:

By default on Red Hat Enterprise Linux, a system administrator can enter single user mode simply by typing "`linux single`" at the GRUB boot-editing menu. Some believe that this is left in to ease support of users with lost root passwords. In any case, it represents a clear security risk – authentication should *always* be required for root-level access. It should be noted that it is extremely difficult to prevent compromise by any attacker who has knowledge, tools, and full physical access to a system.

This kind of measure, in a simple way, increases the difficulty of compromise by requiring more of each of these factors. These last two items have attempted to address concerns of physical/boot security. To make these preparations more complete, one should consider setting the BIOS to boot only from the main hard disk and locking this setting with a BIOS password.

For more information on reducing the threat posed by an attacker with physical/boot access, consider the article "Anyone with a Screwdriver Can Break In," available at:

<http://www.bastille-linux.org/jay/anyone-with-a-screwdriver.html>.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
cd /etc
if [ "`grep -l sulogin inittab`" = "" ]; then
    awk '{ print }; /^id:[0123456sS]:initdefault:/ { print
"~~:S:wait:/sbin/sulogin" }' \
    inittab > /tmp/cis/inittab.tmp
    /bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/inittab.tmp inittab
    chown root:root inittab
    chmod 0600 inittab
    echo "diff inittab-preCIS inittab"
    diff inittab-preCIS inittab
else
    echo "OK. /etc/inittab already properly configured for Single-User"
    echo "Mode Authentication."
fi
cd $cishome
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.9 Restrict NFS Client Requests To Privileged Ports

Description:

Setting the secure parameter causes the NFS server process on the local system to ignore NFS client requests that do not originate from the privileged port range (ports less than 1024); and this is the default behavior for RHEL5. This should not hinder normal NFS operations but may block some automated NFS attacks that are run by unprivileged users.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Add the secure option to all entries in the `/etc/exports` file. The following Perl code will perform this action automatically. This isn't necessary if there are no NFS exported filesystems.

```
# Changed the check from '-s' to an exact 'value-based' check if the size is
greater then 3 characters
# This is due to a failing in /etc/init.d/nfs improperly putting two characters in
/etc/exports.
echo "/etc/exports size is (`wc -c /etc/exports | cut -d' ' -f1`)."
if [ `wc -c /etc/exports | cut -d' ' -f1` == 0 ]; then
    echo "Ok - No changes were necessary to /etc/exports."
else
    echo "Size (for /etc/exports) is greater than 0"
    ls -la /etc/export*
    perl -i.orig -pe 'next if (/^\s*#/ || /^\s*$/);
($res, @hst) = split(" ");
foreach $ent (@hst) {
    undef(%set);
```

```
($optlist) = $sent =~ /\((.*?)\)/;
foreach $opt (split(/,/, $optlist)) {
    $set{$opt} = 1;
}
delete($set{"insecure"});
$set{"secure"} = 1;
$sent =~ s/\((.*?)\)/;
$sent .= "(" . join(",", keys(%set)) . ")";
}
$hst[0] = "(secure)" unless (@hst);
$_ = "$res\t" . join(" ", @hst) . "\n";' /etc/exports
fi
# echo "zq-Debugging...`ls -la /etc/exports`"
chown root:root /etc/exports
chmod 0644 /etc/exports
echo "diff /etc/exports-preCIS /etc/exports"
diff /etc/exports-preCIS /etc/exports
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

8.10 Only Enable syslog To Accept Messages, If Absolutely Necessary

Description:

By default the system logging daemon, `syslogd`, in Linux systems, does not listen for logging messages from other systems on network port 514/udp, and thus by default is more secure.

It is considered a good security management practice to set up one or more machines as central "log servers" to aggregate log traffic from all machines at a site. However, unless a system is set up to be one of these "log server" systems, it should not be listening on 514/udp for incoming log messages as the protocol used to transfer these messages does not include any form of authentication, so a malicious outsider could simply barrage the local system's syslog port with spurious traffic either as a denial-of- service attack on the system, or to fill up the local system's logging file systems so that subsequent attacks will not be logged.

Note: A future edition of this Benchmark will see this section moved/combined within Section 6.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is this machine a log server, or does it need to receive Syslog messages via the network from other systems?

If the answer to this question is yes, then perform the action below.

Read syslog manpage to understand the -l, -r and -s options.

Edit `/etc/init.d/syslog` and look for the line that says:

```
SYSLOGD_OPTIONS="-m 0"
```

and add the entries that are appropriate for the site. An example entry would look like this:

```
SYSLOGD_OPTIONS="-m 0 -l loghost -r -s mydomain.com"
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9 User Accounts and Environment

Note: That the items in this section are tasks that the local administrator should undertake on a regular, ongoing basis perhaps in an automated fashion via cron. The automated host-based scanning tools provided from the Center for Internet Security can be used for this purpose. These scanning tools are typically provided with this document, but are also available for free download from <http://www.CISecurity.org>

9.1 Block Login of System Accounts

Description:

These accounts are non-human system accounts that should be made less useful to an attacker by locking them and setting the shell to a shell not in `/etc/shells`. They can even be deleted if the machines does not use the daemon/service that each is responsible for, though it is safest to simply deactivate them as is done here. To deactivate them, lock the password and set the login shell to an invalid shell. `/dev/null` is a good choice because it is not a valid login shell, and should an attacker attempt to replace it with a copy of a valid shell the system will not operate properly.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# In the book "Hardening Linux", pg 20, it says using "/dev/null" is bad.
echo "Basically change the '/sbin/nologin' portion to '/dev/null' in /etc/passwd"
echo " and add an exclamation point to the password field in /etc/shadow."
cd /etc
for NAME in `cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd`; do
    MyUID=`id -u $NAME`
    if [ $MyUID -lt 500 -a $NAME != 'root' ]; then
        usermod -L -s /dev/null $NAME
    fi
done
ls -la /etc/passwd
echo "sdiff passwd-preCIS passwd"
echo "-----"
chown root:root /etc/passwd
chmod 0644 /etc/passwd
sdiff passwd-preCIS passwd

ls -la /etc/shadow
echo "sdiff shadow-preCIS shadow"
echo "-----"
chown root:root /etc/shadow
chmod 0400 /etc/shadow
sdiff shadow-preCIS shadow
cd $cishome
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.2 Verify That There Are No Accounts With Empty Password Fields

Description:

An account with an empty password field means that anybody may log in as that user without providing a password at all. All accounts should have strong passwords or should be locked by using a password string like “!”. By using “!”, passwd will warn when attempting to unlock an account with an empty password.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

The command:

```
awk -F: '( $2 == "" ) { print $1 }' /etc/shadow
```

should return no lines of output.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.3 Set Account Expiration Parameters On Active Accounts

Description:

It is a good idea to force users to change passwords on a regular basis. The commands below will set all active accounts (except system accounts) to force password changes every 90 days (-M 90), and then prevent password changes for seven days (-m 7) thereafter. Users will begin receiving warnings 14 days (-W 14) before their password expires. Once the password expired, the account will be locked out after 7 days (-I 7). Finally, the instructions below set a minimum password length of 9 characters. These are recommended starting values. Some regulated industries require more restrictive values – ensure they comply with the local Enterprise security policy.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# Interestingly enough, the login.defs manpage indicates these functions are now
all handled by PAM.
```

```
# This changes the defaults applicable to new accounts added to the system after
this point.
```

```
cd /etc
awk '($1 ~ /^PASS_MAX_DAYS/) { $2="90" }
    ($1 ~ /^PASS_MIN_DAYS/) { $2="7" }
    ($1 ~ /^PASS_WARN_AGE/) { $2="14" }
    ($1 ~ /^PASS_MIN_LEN/) { $2="9" }
    { print }' login.defs-preCIS > login.defs
```

```
useradd -D -f 7
```

```
# This applies the same basis of changes to existing accounts.
```

```
# -m: (7) The number of days between permitted password changes.
```

```
# -M: (90) The maximum number of days a password is valid.
```

```
# -W: (14) The maximum number of days of advanced warning before a password is no
longer valid.
# -I: (7) The maximum number of days of inactivity, after a password has expired,
before the account is locked.
for NAME in `cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd`; do
    uid=`id -u $NAME`
    if [ $uid -ge 500 -a $uid != 65534 ]; then
        chage -m 7 -M 90 -W 14 -I 7 $NAME
    fi
done
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> login.defs

# The following 02 lines added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec 9.3
# Establish a forced five-second minimum delay between failed logins
FAIL_DELAY      5
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root login.defs
chmod 0640      login.defs
echo "diff shadow-preCIS shadow"
    diff shadow-preCIS shadow
cd $cishome
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.4 Verify No Legacy '+' Entries Exist In passwd, shadow, And group Files

Description:

Plus ('+') entries in various files used to be markers for systems to insert data from NIS maps at a certain point in a system configuration file. These entries may provide an avenue for attackers to gain privileged access on the system, and should be deleted if they exist.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# Do a context specific diff to only show differences related to having plus signs
in the file.
# Otherwise the output is too much
grep -v ^+: /etc/group > /tmp/cis/group.tmp
grep -v ^+: /etc/gshadow > /tmp/cis/gshadow.tmp
grep -v ^+: /etc/passwd > /tmp/cis/passwd.tmp
grep -v ^+: /etc/shadow > /tmp/cis/shadow.tmp
# Express the essence of what is compared.
echo "diff /etc/group-preCIS /etc/group"
    diff /etc/group-preCIS /tmp/cis/group.tmp
echo "diff /etc/gshadow-preCIS /etc/gshadow"
    diff /etc/gshadow-preCIS /tmp/cis/gshadow.tmp
echo "diff /etc/passwd-preCIS /etc/passwd"
    diff /etc/passwd-preCIS /tmp/cis/passwd.tmp
echo "diff /etc/shadow-preCIS /etc/shadow"
    diff /etc/shadow-preCIS /tmp/cis/shadow.tmp
```

```
chown root:root /tmp/cis/group.tmp /tmp/cis/gshadow.tmp /tmp/cis/passwd.tmp
/tmp/cis/shadow.tmp
chmod 0644 /tmp/cis/group.tmp /tmp/cis/passwd.tmp
chmod 0400 /tmp/cis/gshadow.tmp
/tmp/cis/shadow.tmp
/bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/group.tmp /etc/group
/bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/gshadow.tmp /etc/gshadow
/bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/passwd.tmp /etc/passwd
/bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/shadow.tmp /etc/shadow
```

should return no lines of output.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.5 No '.' or Group/World-Writable Directory In Root's \$PATH

Description:

Including the current working directory '.' (dot) or other writable directory in root's executable path makes it likely that an attacker can gain superuser access by forcing an administrator operating as `root` to execute a Trojan horse program.

Note: Errors occur when a directory specified in the path does not exist. For example, on a new RHEL5 build, the below find generated this error:

```
find: /root/bin: No such file or directory
```

Investigate and correct the cause of such errors.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

The automated testing tool supplied with this Benchmark will alert the administrator if action is required.

To find '.' in \$PATH:

```
echo $PATH | egrep ' (^|:) (\.|:|$) '
```

To find group- or world-writable directories in \$PATH:

```
# Part 1
echo "Any entries listed here should be fixed (other than an error for missing
/root/bin)."
```

```
echo "PATH($PATH)."
```

```
echo "Any entries listed next indicated a period exists in the PATH environment
variable (BAD)."
```

```
echo $PATH | egrep ' (^|:) (\.|:|$) '
```

```
# Part 2
echo "Here, are paths with group/world writeable directories in root's PATH
(BAD)."
```

```
echo "(roots PATH variable contains '/root/bin', even though that directory
doesn't exist, by default)"
# Does anyone know why '/root/bin' is there in root's $PATH in the first
place?
echo "(Errors regarding /mnt/sysimage, are ghosts held over from a kickstarted
system build"
echo " implementation and can be safely ignored)"
find `echo $PATH | tr ':' ' '` -type d \( -perm -002 -o -perm -020 \) -ls
echo ""
```

These commands should produce no errors or output on a properly hardened system.

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.6 User Home Directories Should Be Mode 0750 or More Restrictive

Description:

Group or world-writable user home directories may enable malicious users to steal or modify other users' data or to gain another user's system privileges. Disabling "read" and "execute" access for users who are not members of the same group (the "other" access category) allows for appropriate use of discretionary access control by each user. While the below modifications are relatively benign, making global modifications to user home directories without alerting the user community can result in unexpected outages and unhappy users. Also, consider special case home directories such as the sftp / ftp accounts used to transfer web content to a web server, typically need to be world readable (r) and searchable (x) as they contain documents for the web server.

User home directories are a potentially fragile area that foster human interaction with the system, ostensibly for the purpose of mission-oriented work. The hazards of weak passwords and numerous other insecurities potentially leave this area fertile for miscreant attention. One way to combat this is to tighten permission to 0700 for home directories. This would be in addition to what is recommended here (and not currently scored).

The `nfsnobody` user account has a UID of 65534, and a home directory of `/var/lib/nfs`.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
for DIR in `awk -F: '( $3 >= 500 ) { print $6 }' /etc/passwd`; do
    if [ $DIR != /var/lib/nfs ]; then
        chmod -R g-w $DIR
        chmod -R o-rwx $DIR
    fi
done
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.7 No User Dot-Files Should Be World-Writable

Description:

World-writable user configuration files may enable malicious users to steal or modify other users' data or to gain another user's system privileges. While the below modifications are relatively benign, making global modifications to user home directories without alerting the user community can result in unexpected outages and unhappy users.

One option is to add protective commands into `/etc/profile` which execute as the user logs in everytime to enforce user dot files not being world write-able. Though not scored or recommended empirically by CIS, it is an option if the user environment supports it.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
for DIR in `awk -F: '($3 >= 500) { print $6 }' /etc/passwd`; do
  for FILE in $DIR/[A-Za-z0-9]*; do
    if [ ! -h "$FILE" -a -f "$FILE" ]; then
      chmod go-w "$FILE"
    fi
  done
done
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.8 Remove User .netrc Files

Description:

`.netrc` files may contain unencrypted passwords which may be used to attack other systems. While the below modifications are relatively benign, making global modifications to user home directories without alerting the user community can result in unexpected outages and unhappy users. If the first command returns any results, carefully evaluate the ramifications of removing those files before executing the remaining commands as it may end up impacting an application that has not had time to revise its architecture to a more secure design. And the output from these commands can lend further support to administrative efforts in those directions.

One option is to add protective commands into `/etc/profile` which execute as the user logs in everytime to enforce removal of `.netrc` files. Though not scored or recommended empirically by CIS, it is an option if the user environment is not adversely affected by it.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
find / -name .netrc > /tmp/cis/LISTof.netrcFiles 2>&1
```

Stop!!! Read the discussion before proceeding.

```
cat /tmp/cis/LISTof.netrcFiles
echo "Now doing a targeted search of user home directories."
echo "No output here is correct."
for DIR in `cut -d":" -f6 /etc/passwd`; do
    if [ -e $DIR/.netrc ]; then
        echo "Removing $DIR/.netrc"
        rm -f $DIR/.netrc
    fi
done
# Once this is done, there should be options to search NIS and LDAP stores for userID's
# Determine if they are local to this system and then check them, too.
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.9 Set Default umask For Users

Description:

With a default umask setting of `077` – a setting agreed to as part of a security consensus/discussion process with DISA and NSA – files and directories created by users should not be readable (by default) by any other human user on the system. The user creating the file has the discretion of making their files and directories readable by others via the `chmod` command. Users who wish to allow their files and directories to be readable by others by default may choose a different default umask by inserting the `umask` command into the standard shell configuration files (`.profile`, `.cshrc`, etc.) in their home directories. A umask of `027` would make files and directories readable by users in the same Unix group, while a umask of `022` would make files readable by every user on the system. A gentler umask value that many institutions use is `022`, due to the problems within their applications when set to `077`.

Note: This strict a setting (umask of `077`) has been shown to occasionally cause problems with the installation of software packages where the installation script relies on a default umask – the directories are owned by root with `0700` permissions, and then the application and/or daemon cannot read its files. A simple fix to this problem is to manually issue a less restrictive umask (such as `umask 022`) for the shell session doing the installation, or place such a umask command in the beginning to a less restrictive value before the installation, or in the beginning of the installation script. There are, of course, special cases to consider, for example the recommended umask setting of `077` interferes with the sftp and ftp users who need to have the web files transferred be world readable and directories world searchable. Typically, the umask setting needs to be `022` or occasionally `002` for sftp and ftp web transfer accounts. While the umask can be configured in the ftp server configuration file however for sftp users, a patch is required for the sftp server before umask control is available. The patch is available as part of the sftp logging patch <http://sftpllogging.sourceforge.net>

The Benchmark will score for 022 as well as accept/test up to 077. Therefore utilize what is best, yet strictest for the environment.

The Benchmark will adjust root's `umask` setting separately in this item, as root shells don't necessarily read the system-wide configuration files. For example, root sessions using bash doesn't get `umask` settings from `/etc/profile`. The same concerns and recommendations apply to root's `umask` setting.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# Forced umask assignment into /etc/skel/.bashrc for consistency
# (though the CIS scoring tool doesn't check here yet)
CISum='077'
sed -e "s/002/$CISum/" -e "s/022/$CISum/" /etc/bashrc-preCIS >
/etc/bashrc
sed -e "s/002/$CISum/" -e "s/022/$CISum/" /etc/csh.cshrc-preCIS >
/etc/csh.cshrc
sed "s/027/$CISum/" /etc/csh.login-preCIS >
/etc/csh.login
sed "s/027/$CISum/" /etc/profile-preCIS >
/etc/profile
echo "umask $CISum" >>
/etc/skel/.bashrc
sed "s/027/077/" /root/.bash_profile-preCIS >
/root/.bash_profile
echo "umask 077" >> /root/.bashrc
echo "umask 077" >> /root/.cshrc
echo "umask 077" >> /root/.tcshrc
chown root:root /etc/bashrc /etc/csh.cshrc /etc/csh.login /etc/profile
chmod 0444 /etc/bashrc /etc/csh.cshrc /etc/csh.login /etc/profile
chown root:root /root/.bash_profile /root/.bashrc /root/.cshrc /root/.tcshrc
chmod 0400 /root/.bash_profile /root/.bashrc /root/.cshrc /root/.tcshrc
echo "diff /etc/bashrc-preCIS /etc/bashrc"
diff /etc/bashrc-preCIS /etc/bashrc
echo "diff /etc/csh.cshrc-preCIS /etc/csh.cshrc"
diff /etc/csh.cshrc-preCIS /etc/csh.cshrc
echo "diff /etc/csh.login-preCIS /etc/csh.login"
diff /etc/csh.login-preCIS /etc/csh.login
echo "diff /etc/profile-preCIS /etc/profile"
diff /etc/profile-preCIS /etc/profile
echo "diff /root/.bash_profile-preCIS /root/.bash_profile"
diff /root/.bash_profile-preCIS /root/.bash_profile
echo "diff /etc/skel/.bashrc-preCIS /etc/skel/.bashrc"
diff /etc/skel/.bashrc-preCIS /etc/skel/.bashrc
echo "diff /root/.bashrc-preCIS /root/.bashrc"
diff /root/.bashrc-preCIS /root/.bashrc
echo "diff /root/.cshrc-preCIS /root/.cshrc"
diff /root/.cshrc-preCIS /root/.cshrc
echo "diff /root/.tcshrc-preCIS /root/.tcshrc"
diff /root/.tcshrc-preCIS /root/.tcshrc
#
# Suggest a process that walks all existing user accounts (> 500) and force's the
same permissions
# into their profile scripts.
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.10 Disable Core Dumps

Description:

Core dumps can consume large volumes of disk space and may contain sensitive data. On the other hand, developers using this system may require core files in order to aid in debugging. The `limits.conf` file can be used to grant core dump ability to individual users or groups of users.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Do developers need to debug crashed programs or send low-level debugging information to software developers/vendors?

If the answer to this question is no, then perform the action below:

```
awk ' ( $1 == "#*" && $2 == "soft" && $3 == "core" && $4 == "0" ) { \
    print "*"          soft      core          0"; \
    print "*"          hard      core          0"; next } \
    { print }' /etc/security/limits.conf-preCIS > /etc/security/limits.conf
chown root:root /etc/security/limits.conf
chmod 0644      /etc/security/limits.conf
echo "diff /etc/security/limits.conf-preCIS /etc/security/limits.conf"
diff /etc/security/limits.conf-preCIS /etc/security/limits.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

9.11 Limit Access To The Root Account From su

Description:

The `su` command allows a system administrator to become other users on the system. This is commonly used to become “`root`” and execute commands as the super-user. If it is not desirable for certain users to `su` to `root` then uncomment the following line in `/etc/pam.d/su`:

```
auth required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_wheel.so use_uid
```

Uncommenting this line allows only the users in the `wheel` group to become `root` by using the `su` command and entering the `root` password. All other users will receive a benign message stating the password is incorrect.

By limiting access to the `root` account, even if a user knows the `root` password, they will not be able to become `root` unless that user has physical access to the server's console, or they are added to the `wheel` group. This adds another layer of security to the system and prevents unauthorized system access.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

WARNING: Ensure a legitimate administrative user has a valid user account listed in the `wheel` group before running the below script. Failure to do so will prevent anyone from using `su` to become root.

```
echo "Note: With this activated, only members of the wheel group can su to root."
cd /etc/pam.d/
awk '( $1=="#auth" && $2=="required" && $3~"pam_wheel.so" ) \
    { print "auth\t\trequired\t", $3, "\tuse_uid"; next };
    { print }' /etc/pam.d/su-preCIS > /etc/pam.d/su
chown root:root /etc/pam.d/su
chmod 0644 /etc/pam.d/su
echo "diff /etc/pam.d/su-preCIS /etc/pam.d/su"
diff /etc/pam.d/su-preCIS /etc/pam.d/su
cd $cishome
```

```
# Part 2
# The process is beneficial when using kickstart for building of systems, then
# deliberately go back to all those systems and forcefully change the
# root/SysAdmin passwords to be in new.
echo "(${AdminsComma}) are to be System Administrators for this system."
```

```
for USERID in `echo $AdminSP`
do
    echo "1. Dealing with userid($USERID)..."
    ID=`cat /etc/passwd | cut -d: -f1 | grep $USERID 2>&1`
    if [ "$ID" != "$USERID" ]; then
        # The user-id was NOT found
        echo "2a Adding new user ($USERID) 'procedure-compliant'."
        # Use grub-md5-crypt to generate the encrypted password
        useradd -f 7 -m -p '$1$PyDA7$L81b0Splu.DyGnjbRUp/3/' $USERID
        chage -m 7 -M 90 -W 14 -I 7 $USERID
    else
        echo "2b User ($USERID) already in the system."
        chage -m 7 -M 90 -W 14 -I 7 $USERID
    fi
    ls -la /home
done
echo "Doing pwck -r"
pwck -r
echo ""
```

```
# Part 3
# Perform steps to ensure any users identified in $Admins are added to the "wheel"
# group. This is probably only going to add the example 'tstuser' account, or
# whichever userID the system builder names during the initial system build.
# Note: /etc/group requires entries to be comma-separated.
if [ "$Admins" != "" ]; then
    echo "At least one AdminID has been identified to be added to the wheel
group."
    echo "Admins(${Admins}), AdminSP(${AdminSP}), AdminsComma(${AdminsComma})."
    cd /etc
    # Resultant /etc/group file is now nicely sorted as well
    /bin/cp -pf group /tmp/cis/group.tmp
    awk -F: '($1~"wheel" && $4~"root") { print $0 ", " Adds }; \
        ($1 != "wheel") {print}' Adds="`echo $AdminsComma`" \
        /tmp/cis/group.tmp | sort -t: -nk 3 > /tmp/cis/group.tmp1
    chown root:root /tmp/cis/group.tmp1
```

```

    chmod 0644      /tmp/cis/group.tmp1
    /bin/cp -pf /tmp/cis/group.tmp1 group
    echo "sdiff group-preCIS group"
        sdiff group-preCIS group
    cd $cishome
else
    echo "BAD.  No SysAdmin IDs were identified to be added to the wheel
group."
fi

# Part 4
echo "#### This is done in concert with Bastille that was executed before this
step in the"
echo "#### standard baseline hardening.  This will add SPACE-delimited SysAdmin
userIDs to"
echo "#### the /etc/security/access.conf file.  These are the same names as are
added to"
echo "#### the wheel group in the /etc/group file.  This action prohibits any user
NOT in"
echo "#### the wheel group from logging in to the system on the physical console."
echo "#### Can treat this as a known entity with one entry to deal with since the
state of"
echo "#### this system up to this point is well known."
echo "#### No differences may appear, if the same users are listed here, as were
added by bastille."
# The line in question resembles the following, 3 colon-separated fields:
# -:ALL EXCEPT root tstuser:LOCAL
# To be turned into something that looks like the following (sorted IDs are
easier to read):
# -:ALL EXCEPT abc-Admin root def-Admin tstuser:LOCAL
#
cd /etc/security
# Check if there are any uncommented lines to ADD $Admins to.
x=`grep -v ^# access.conf | wc -l | cut -d: -f1`
echo "x($x)"
if [ "$x" == "0" ]; then
    # Most likely the Bastille hardening hasn't been applied yet.
    # Must manually add the users, as the file is otherwise 'empty'.
    echo "Manually adding the ($Admins); none previously existed there."
    echo "-:ALL EXCEPT root" $AdminSP":LOCAL" >> access.conf
else
    # Extract just the userIDs
    x=`grep -v ^# access.conf | cut -d: -f2 | cut -d' ' -f3-`
    # Bundle in the new SysAdmin IDs passed during script invocation, and sort
the names alphabetically.
    # Need a piece here to compare what's there with what we have to add, to
avoid duplicates.
    y=`echo $AdminsComma $x | tr -s ',' ' ' | tr ' ' '\012' | sort -u | tr
'\012' ' '`
    echo "x($x), y($y)";echo ""
    # 2nd -e is to eliminate the extra space before the final colon, if one
exists.
    sed -e "s/$x/$y/" -e 's/ :L/:L/' access.conf-preCIS > access.conf
    # sed "s/$x/$y/" access.conf-preCIS | sed 's/ :L/:L/' > access.conf
fi
echo "diff /etc/security/access.conf-preCIS /etc/security/access.conf"
diff /etc/security/access.conf-preCIS /etc/security/access.conf
chown root:root /etc/security/access.conf
chmod 0640      /etc/security/access.conf

```

```
cd $cihome  
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

10 Warning Banners

Presenting some sort of statutory warning message prior to the normal user logon may assist the prosecution of trespassers on the computer system. Changing some of these login banners also has the side effect/benefit of hiding OS version information and other detailed system information from attackers attempting to target specific attacks at a system (though there are other mechanisms available for acquiring at least some of this information).

Guidelines published by the US Department of Defense require that warning message include at least the name of the organization that owns the system, the fact that the system is subject to monitoring and that such monitoring is in compliance with local statutes, and that use of the system implies consent to such monitoring. Clearly, the organization's local legal counsel and/or site security administrator should review the content of all messages before any system modifications are made, as these warning messages are inherently site-specific.

More information (including citations of relevant case law) can be found at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&sappendix2002.htm>.

10.1 Create Warnings For Network And Physical Access Services

Description:

The contents of the `/etc/issue` file are displayed prior to the login prompt on the system's console and serial devices. `/etc/motd` is generally displayed after all successful logins, no matter where the user is logging in from, but is thought to be less useful because it only provides notification to the user after the machine has been accessed.

Edit the banner currently in `/etc/issue` – if empty, utilize copy provided below and it may need to be changed for the local Enterprise, based upon policy. Leave the words “COMPANYNAME” as this will be replaced in the next step with the name of the organization.

```
NOTICE TO USERS
-----
```

```
This computer system is the private property of COMPANYNAME, whether
individual, corporate or government. It is for authorized use only. Users
(authorized & unauthorized) have no explicit/implicit expectation of privacy
```

```
Any or all uses of this system and all files on this system may be
intercepted, monitored, recorded, copied, audited, inspected, and disclosed
to your employer, to authorized site, government, and/or law enforcement
personnel, as well as authorized officials of government agencies, both
domestic and foreign.
```

```
By using this system, the user expressly consents to such interception,
monitoring, recording, copying, auditing, inspection, and disclosure at the
discretion of such officials. Unauthorized or improper use of this system
may result in civil and criminal penalties and administrative or disciplinary
action, as appropriate. By continuing to use this system you indicate your
awareness of and consent to these terms and conditions of use. LOG OFF
IMMEDIATELY if you do not agree to the conditions stated in this warning.
```

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Create banners for console access:

Note: Change “COMPANYNAME” in the text below to an appropriate value for the organization (don’t use any special characters like single or double quote marks).

```
unalias cp mv
cd /etc
# Remove OS indicators from banners
for FILE in issue motd; do
    cp -f ${FILE} ${FILE}.tmp
    egrep -vi "red hat|kernel|fedora" ${FILE}.tmp > ${FILE}
    rm -f ${FILE}.tmp
done
# Change name of owner
# Remember to enter name of your company here:
COMPANYNAME="The Company"
cp -f issue issue.tmp
sed -e "s/its owner/${COMPANYNAME}/g" issue.tmp > issue
rm -f issue.tmp
diff issue-preCIS issue
if [ "`grep -i authorized /etc/issue`" == "" ]; then
    echo "Authorized uses only. All activity may be \
    monitored and reported." >> /etc/issue
fi
if [ "`grep -i authorized /etc/motd`" == "" ]; then
    echo "Authorized uses only. All activity may be \
    monitored and reported." >> /etc/motd
fi
```

3. Create banners for network access:
/bin/cp -pf /etc/issue /etc/issue.net
/bin/cp -pf /etc/issue /etc/motd

4. Protect banner:

```
chown root:root /etc/issue /etc/issue.net /etc/motd
chmod 0644 /etc/issue /etc/issue.net /etc/motd
echo "diff /etc/issue-preCIS /etc/issue"
diff /etc/issue-preCIS /etc/issue
echo "diff /etc/issue.net-preCIS /etc/issue.net"
diff /etc/issue.net-preCIS /etc/issue.net
echo "diff /etc/motd-preCIS /etc/motd"
diff /etc/motd-preCIS /etc/motd
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

10.2 Create Warnings For GUI-Based Logins

Description:

The standard graphical login program for Red Hat Enterprise Linux is `gdm`, which requires the user to enter their username in one text box and their password in a second text box. The commands below set the warning message on `xdm`, `kdm` and `gdm` – in case something other than the default X login GUI was chosen to be installed.

These are optional settings to make, if the X Windows interface is not installed (and it isn't required for Linux to be operational).

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# 1st Part
if [ $Consent == "DoD" ]; then
    echo "Set for DoD"
    GreetMsg1='xlogin*greeting: This is a U.S. Govt Computer - Authorized USE
only!'
    GreetMsg2='This is a U.S. Govt Computer - Authorized USE only!'
else
    # Alternative is to be left as Generic/Anonymous
    echo "=====
    echo " Set for Generic/Anonymous"
    echo "=====
    GreetMsg1='xlogin*greeting: This is a private system --- Authorized USE
only!'
    GreetMsg2='This is a private system --- Authorized USE only!'
fi

# 2nd Part
if [ -e /etc/X11/xdm/Xresources ]; then
    cd /etc/X11/xdm
    awk '/xlogin*greeting:/ { print GreetValue; next };
    { print }' GreetValue="$GreetMsg1" Xresources-preCIS > Xresources
    chown root:root Xresources
    chmod 0644 Xresources
    echo "diff Xresources-preCIS Xresources"
    diff Xresources-preCIS Xresources
    cd $cishome
else
    echo "OK. No '/etc/X11/xdm/Xresources'."
fi
echo ""

# 3rd Part
if [ -e /etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc ]; then
    cd /etc/X11/xdm
    awk '/GreetString=/ \
    { print "GreetString=" GreetString; next };
    { print }' GreetString="$GreetMsg2" kdmrc-preCIS > kdmrc
    chown root:root kdmrc
    chmod 0644 kdmrc
    echo "diff kdmrc-preCIS kdmrc"
    diff kdmrc-preCIS kdmrc
    cd $cishome
else
```

```
    echo "OK.  No '/etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc'."
fi
echo ""

# 4th Part - Provided by Dave Mullins (RHCE), ProSync 20070206"
# This FORCES the user, upon successfully passing thru a credentialed GUI login,
# to positively acknowledge Consent-to-Use.
if [ -e /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default ]; then
    ed /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default <<END_SCRIPT
1
/^SESSREG=
a
/usr/bin/xmessage -center -buttons " I acknowledge and consent to monitoring \
":2," Cancel Login ":3 -file /etc/issue
egxit="\$?"
if [ \$egxit != 2 ]; then
    # Immediately FORCE logout by killing the 'X' session process
    echo "Consent-To-Use: User (\$LOGNAME) cancelled login (\`date\`)." \
    >> /var/log/messages
    kill -9 \`ps -ef |grep /usr/bin/X |grep -v grep | tr -s ' ' | cut -d' ' -f2\`
fi
.
w
q
END_SCRIPT
    chown root:root /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default
    chmod 0755 /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default
    echo "diff /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default-preCIS /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default"
        diff /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default-preCIS /etc/gdm/PreSession/Default
else
    echo "Part 4-OK.  No '/etc/gdm/PreSession/Default file to harden'."
fi
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

10.3 Create "authorized only" Banners For vsftpd, proftpd, If Applicable

Description:

This item configures a vsftpd "authorized users only" banner messages.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
cd /etc
if [ -d vsftpd ]; then
    cd vsftpd
fi
if [ -e vsftpd.conf ]; then
    echo "ftpd_banner=Authorized users only.  All activity may be monitored and
reported." >> vsftpd.conf
```



```
echo "diff vsftpd.conf-preCIS vsftpd.conf"
diff vsftpd.conf-preCIS vsftpd.conf
chown root:root vsftpd.conf
chmod 0600      vsftpd.conf
else
  echo "OK - No vsftpd to change."
fi
cd $cishome
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

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11 Misc odds and ends

11.1 Configure and enable the auditd and sysstat services, if possible

Description:

System auditing is an essential element to the defense-in-depth paradigm for system security hardening. The following remediation configures and enables the auditing service to collect logging records. Also, the `sysstat` service is enabled.

Note: This is applicable to 32bit RHEL5, not 64bit. Further testing/work is necessary to provide a safe, stable and sane configuration for 64bit.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
echo "Configure and enable the auditd and sysstat services, if possible."
date
auditPATH='unknown'
if [ -e /etc/audit.rules ]; then
    # RHEL AS4 implementation
    auditPATH='/etc'
else
    if [ -e /etc/audit/audit.rules ]; then
        # RHEL5 implementation
        auditPATH='/etc/audit'
    fi
fi
if [ "$auditPATH" == "unknown" ]; then
    echo "Auditing service not installed"
else
    # Part 1
    # Enable auditing (within the context of the 'audit.rules' file)
    # Restarting 'auditd' makes this take effect, or rebooting.
    # Of course the 'service' must be started/enabled.
    ed $auditPATH/audit.rules <<END_SCRIPT
1
/-D
a
# The following 03 lines added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec
11.1:
# This addition satisfies DISA SRR #s GEN002720, GEN002740, GEN002760 and
GEN002820.
# "-e 1" enables/turns on the auditing subsystem (0 disables it, leaves it off).
-e 1
.
w
q
END_SCRIPT
    chown root:root $auditPATH/audit.rules
    # Red Hat default/original permissions were 0640.
    chmod 0600 $auditPATH/audit.rules
    echo "diff $auditPATH/audit.rules-preCIS $auditPATH/audit.rules"
        diff $auditPATH/audit.rules-preCIS $auditPATH/audit.rules

    # Part 2
    echo "Enforce basic auditing minimums."
```

```
# This will enforce basic auditing minimums applicable to EVERY system.
/bin/cp -pf $auditPATH/audit.rules /tmp/cis/audit.rules.tmp
# Increase the size of the log
sed "s/-b 256/-b 1024/" /tmp/cis/audit.rules.tmp >
$auditPATH/audit.rules
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> $auditPATH/audit.rules
# The following 10 lines added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec
11.1 (part 2):
# These additions satisfy DISA SRR #s GEN002720, GEN002740, GEN002760 and
GEN002820.
-a exit,always -S open -F success!=0
-a exit,always -S unlink -S rmdir
-w /var/log/audit/
-w /etc/auditd.conf
-w /etc/audit.rules
-a exit,always -S stime -S acct -S reboot -S swapon -S settimeofday
-a exit,always -S setrlimit -S setdomainname -S sched_setparam -S
sched_setscheduler
-a exit,always -S chmod -S fchmod -S chown -S chown32 -S fchown
-a exit,always -S fchown32 -S lchown -Slchown32
END_SCRIPT
    chown root:root $auditPATH/audit.rules
    chmod 0600 $auditPATH/audit.rules
    echo "diff $auditPATH/audit.rules-preCIS $auditPATH/audit.rules"
        diff $auditPATH/audit.rules-preCIS $auditPATH/audit.rules

# Part 3
echo "Strengthen auditd.conf settings."
sed -e "s/num_logs = 4/num_logs = 5/" \
    -e "s/max_log_file = 5/max_log_file = 100/" \
    -e "s/space_left = 75/space_left = 125/" \
    -e "s/admin_space_left = 50/admin_space_left = 75/" \
    -e "s/space_left_action = SYSLOG/space_left_action = email/" \
    $auditPATH/auditd.conf-preCIS > $auditPATH/auditd.conf
chown root:root $auditPATH/auditd.conf
# Default permissions were originally 0640.
chmod 0600 $auditPATH/auditd.conf
echo "diff $auditPATH/auditd.conf-preCIS $auditPATH/auditd.conf"
    diff $auditPATH/auditd.conf-preCIS $auditPATH/auditd.conf

# Part 4
echo "Make auditd applicable across reboots."
chkconfig --list auditd
chkconfig --list sysstat
echo "-----"
chkconfig --level 35 auditd on
chkconfig --level 35 sysstat on
echo "-----"
# Enable the auditd service upon next boot, but not at this time
# service auditd restart
service sysstat restart
echo "-----"
chkconfig --list auditd
chkconfig --list sysstat
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
fi
echo ""
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

11.2 Verify no duplicate userIDs exist

Description:

Eliminate duplicate userIDs, unless a mission application cannot function without them.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
echo "Verify no duplicate userIDs exist."
date
echo "          No output is good."
# Though CIS 7.4 is already set up to eliminate duplicates naturally.
#          sort the userid name field to a temp file with "-u", then diff the
two
#          sort the UID field to a temp file with -u then diff the two
#          any differences equate to problems
# Sort/check ID
sort -t:      /etc/group      > /tmp/cis/group.p1
otherID=''
for x in `cut -d: -f1 /tmp/cis/group.p1`;
do
    if [ "$x" == "$otherID" ]; then
        echo "Duplicate userIDs exist in /etc/group ($x)."

```

```
        echo "Duplicate UIDs exist in /etc/passwd ($x)."  
    fi  
    otherUID=$x  
done  
echo ""
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

11.3 Force permissions on root's home directory to be 0700

Description:

Protect the `root` home directory from non-administrative users.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
ls -lad /root  
chown root:root /root  
chmod 0700 /root  
ls -lad /root
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

11.4 Utilize PAM to Enforce UserID password complexity

Description:

This puts protections in place for PAM authentication, clearly defining password complexity (also, resolves DISA SRR (GEN000600/620/640/800)) in a strengthened manner. The minimum length for the number of required characters is 1, though increasing this (say to 2 or even 3) is acceptable. This metric applies to the number of uppercase, lowercase, digits and special characters combined to form a legitimate password. Additionally, the minimum length of 9 characters for a password increases the time required for traditional password cracking tools to execute in order to gain access.

Note: The password complexity enforcement changes made to `/etc/pam.d/system-auth` have been manually accomplished by using the script let below. Such changes will be overwritten if `authconfig` is ever executed. The `authconfig` utility has no mechanism to recognize these changes nor to save or implement them in any other way.

Additional information can be found on the web:

http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/sysadmin/pam_cracklib.html

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```

echo "Address DISA SRR (GEN000600/620/640/800) ($RHELver)."
```

date

Have to copy the file before modifying it, as its also worked on in CIS SN.8.

dcredit is number of numerals/digits required (1)

lcredit is number of lower-case characters required (1)

ocredit is number of other/special/punctuation characters required (1)

ucredit is number of upper-case characters required (1)

```

cd /etc/pam.d
/bin/cp -pf /etc/pam.d/system-auth /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp
if [ "$RHELver" == "RHELAS4" ]; then
    echo "Applicable to RHEL AS4"
    awk '( $1 == "password" && $2 == "requisite" && $3 ==
"/lib/security/$ISA/pam_cracklib.so" ) { \
        print $0 " dcredit=-1 lcredit=-1 ocredit=-1 ucredit=-1
minlen=9"; next }; \
        { print }' /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp > system-auth
else
    echo "Applicable to RHEL5"
    awk '( $1 == "password" && $2 == "requisite" && $3 == "pam_cracklib.so" ) { \
        print $0 " dcredit=-2 lcredit=-2 ocredit=-2 ucredit=-2
minlen=9"; next }; \
        { print }' /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp > system-auth
fi
chown root:root /etc/pam.d/system-auth
chmod 0644 /etc/pam.d/system-auth
echo "diff /etc/pam.d-preCIS/system-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth"
diff /etc/pam.d-preCIS/system-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth
echo "-----also RHEL($RHELver) -----"
echo " system-auth {original contents} -----"
cat /etc/pam.d-preCIS/system-auth
echo " system-auth {updated contents} -----"
cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth
echo "-----"
echo "Protecting a hardened copy of /etc/pam.d/system-auth"
/bin/cp -pf /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth.HardenedProtectedCopy
ls -la /etc/pam.d/system-auth*
cd $cishome
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

11.5 Restrict permissions to 0644 on /usr/share/man and /usr/share/doc content

Description:

Reduce the excessive permissions on man pages and system documentation files down to 0644, from 0666. These are stable files, provided by the Operating System and package vendor that users have no need for more than read access to.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
echo "Restrict permissions to 0644 on /usr/share/man and /usr/share/doc content"
date
chmod -R go-w /usr/share/doc /usr/local/share/doc
chmod -R go-w /usr/share/man /usr/local/share/man
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

11.6 Set permissions on cron scripts known to be executed by cron to be 0600

Description:

Establish restrictive permissions on scripts known to be executed by cron, to 0600.

Note: A future edition of this Benchmark will see this section moved/combined within Section 8.4.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
echo "Set permissions on cron scripts known to be executed by cron to be 0600"
date
if [ -e /etc/log.d ]; then
    # Applicable to RHEL AS4
    echo "Setting permissions on scripts with /etc/log.d"
    find /etc/log.d/scripts -type f -exec chmod 0600 {} \;
else
    echo "/etc/log.d not found on this system."
fi
echo ""
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

11.7 Reboot

Description:

Whenever making substantial changes to a system, reboot. Some System Administrators believe any change to the init scripts warrant a reboot to ensure the system comes up as expected. Hours of lost productivity with extensive troubleshooting (not to mention lost revenue) have occurred because a system did not start up as expected. The root cause was an init problem that would have been detected had the reboot taken place.

Scriptlets executed from this Benchmark create new versions of many existing configuration files. In the process of hardening the system, such scriptlets will cause the pre-existing SELinux context to be lost. Touching the `/.autorelabel` file and subsequently rebooting the system will reapply them.

Rationale: TBD

Remediation:

```
Touch /.autorelabel
init 6
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

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12 Anti-Virus Consideration

Certain systems – such as mail servers and file servers – at a minimum, should have anti-virus software installed to protect the Windows clients that use the server. Few Linux focused viruses exist, though the greatest protection would be the ubiquitous nature of Windows clients, applications and data that pass to, from and through Linux servers.

The following table summarizes some popular anti-virus offerings which are optionally available for the Linux platform. The Center for Internet Security makes no endorsement for any particular product. Usage (or lack) of any Anti-Virus product does not affect the overall CIS-CAT score for the system being evaluated.

<u>Vendor</u>	<u>Product</u>
Computer Associates InoculateIT; http://www.cai.com	Commercial
Clam AV; http://www.clamav.net	Commercial
CyberSoft Vfiind; http://www.cyber.com/products/masterprice.html	Commercial
f-prot AntiVirus; http://www.f-prot.com/products/corporate_users/unix	Commercial
H+B edv (hbedv); http://www.pintunet.com	Commercial
McAfee; http://www.mcafee.com	Commercial
NAI Virus Scan; http://www.nai.com	Commercial
Sophos; http://www.sophos.com	Commercial
Trend Micro; http://www.trendmicro.com	Commercial

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13 Remove CIS Benchmark Hardening Backup Files

Description:

When the Benchmark hardening changes are successful and tested, remove the backup files as they will have insecure contents and/or permissions/ownerships. Further, they consume additional disk space. By leaving these files on the system, an attacker can use the backup files as if they were the originals thereby defeating much of the CIS security hardening efforts. The last entry removes temporary intermediary files utilized during hardening actions.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
find / -xdev | grep preCIS | xargs rm -rf
rm -rf /etc/cron.d-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/cron.daily-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/cron.hourly-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/cron.monthly-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/cron.weekly-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/pam.d-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/rc.d-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/skel-preCIS
rm -rf /etc/xinetd.d-preCIS
rm -rf /var/spool/cron-preCIS
```

System cleanup:

At the beginning of the CIS RHEL5 Benchmark hardening process, a temporary place was created for storage of work files. Now is the time to clean up those insecure files.

```
rm -rf /tmp/cis
```

Scoring Status: Not Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

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Appendix A: Additional Security Notes

The items in this section are security configuration settings that have been suggested by several other resources and system hardening tools. However, given the other settings in the Benchmark document, the settings presented here provide relatively little incremental security benefit. Nevertheless, none of these settings should have a significant impact on the functionality of the system, and some sites may feel that the slight security enhancement of these settings outweighs the (sometimes minimal) administrative cost of performing them.

None of these settings will be checked by the automated scoring tool provided with the Benchmark document. They are purely optional and may be applied or not at the discretion of local site administrators.

Note: As a matter of performance, accomplish these actions prior to completion of hardening in Section 13 of this Benchmark.

SN.1 Create Symlinks For Dangerous Files

Description:

The `/root/.rhosts`, `/root/.shosts`, and `/etc/hosts.equiv` files enable a weak form of access control (see the discussion of `.rhosts` files below). Attackers will often target these files as part of their exploit scripts. By linking these files to `/dev/null`, any data that an attacker writes to these files is simply discarded (though an astute attacker can still remove the link prior to writing their malicious data).

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
for FILE in /root/.rhosts /root/.shosts /etc/hosts.equiv /etc/shosts.equiv; do
    rm -f $FILE
    ln -s /dev/null $FILE
done
```

Scoring Status: Not Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.2 Change Default Greeting String For sendmail

Description:

The default SMTP greeting string displays the version of the Sendmail software running on the remote system. Hiding this information is generally considered to be good practice, since it can help attackers target attacks at machines running a vulnerable version of Sendmail. However, the actions in the Benchmark document completely disable Sendmail on the system, so changing this default greeting string is something of a moot point unless the machine happens to be an email server.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
cd /etc/mail
awk '/O SmtgGreetingMessage=/ { print "O SmtgGreetingMessage=Mail Server Ready;
$b"; next}
{ print }' sendmail.cf-preCIS | sed 's/^O HelpFile=#O HelpFile=' >
sendmail.cf
chown root:bin sendmail.cf
chmod 0444 sendmail.cf
echo "diff sendmail.cf-preCIS sendmail.cf"
diff sendmail.cf-preCIS sendmail.cf
cd $cishome
echo ""
# Part 2 - Deactivate the decode entry in the /etc/aliases file
echo "Fixed /etc/aliases without decode"
sed 's/^decode:|#decode:/' /etc/aliases-preCIS > /etc/aliases
newaliases
chown root:root /etc/aliases
chmod 0644 /etc/aliases
echo "diff /etc/aliases-preCIS /etc/aliases"
diff /etc/aliases-preCIS /etc/aliases
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.3 Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection

Description:

A "SYN Attack" is a denial of service (DoS) attack that consumes resources on the system forcing a reboot. This particular attack is performed by beginning the TCP connection handshake (sending the SYN packet), and then never completing the process to open the connection. This leaves the system with several (hundreds or thousands) of half-open connections. This is a fairly simple attack and should be blocked.

Note: A future edition of this Benchmark will probably combine this entry with CIS 5.1, and employ this fix via /etc/sysctl.conf.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
echo "echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies" >> /etc/rc.d/rc.local
chown root:root /etc/rc.d/rc.local
chmod 0600 /etc/rc.d/rc.local
echo "diff /etc/rc.d-preCIS/rc.local /etc/rc.d/rc.local"
diff /etc/rc.d-preCIS/rc.local /etc/rc.d/rc.local
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.4 Additional GRUB Security

Description:

Setting the immutable flag on the GRUB config files will prevent any changes (accidental or otherwise) to the grub.conf or menu.lst files. Preferably, to modify either file, unset the immutable flag using the `chattr` command with `-i` instead of `+i`.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
[ -e /boot/grub/menu.lst ] && echo "(set immutable) for /boot/grub/menu.lst"
[ -e /boot/grub/menu.lst ] && /usr/bin/chattr +i /boot/grub/menu.lst

[ -e /boot/grub/grub.conf ] && echo "(set immutable) for /boot/grub/grub.conf"
[ -e /boot/grub/grub.conf ] && /usr/bin/chattr +i /boot/grub/grub.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.5 Evaluate Packages Associated With Startup Scripts

Description:

The most effective way to get rid of the much of the unused software is to look in the startup directory `/etc/init.d` and evaluate which of these remaining services are not necessary. Use `rpm -qf <scriptname>` to determine the package it belongs to, use `rpm -qi <packagename>` to read about it, then use `rpm -e <packagename>` to remove it.

For example, this server may not use Broadcom NIC drivers, and therefore will not need the `bcm5820` package. `rpm -qf bcm5820` shows us `bcm5820` belongs to `bcm5820-1.17-6`. `rpm -qi bcm5820` proves we do not need this package. `rpm -e bcm5820` takes care of it.

In some cases, it might not be desirable or possible to remove a script/package – `kdcrotate` is a good example: it belongs to package `krb5-libs`, which is required by several packages, including `sendmail` and `nss_ldap`. In cases like this, use `chkconfig <servicename> off` to keep it from running.

Note: Consider configuring iptables to act as a server-level firewall. There is controversy over this technique as some organizations feel all they need is the perimeter firewall and others feel the perimeter is just the first line of defense.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

How many of the startup scripts do you really need?

Perform the action below.

```
cd /etc/init.d  
ls -la
```

Scoring Status: Not Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.6 Evaluate Every Installed Package

Description:

The default Red Hat Enterprise Linux installation includes many packages that are usually not necessary in an Enterprise server environment (dosfstools, for example). This should be done as a precursor to any system installation, especially in a Configuration Managed environment.

Computer Security Industry Best Practices recommend removing unused services and software to minimize attack vectors on a system.

The following references suggest and discuss removing unused software:

- Common Sense Guide to Cyber Security for Small Businesses – Recommended Actions for Information Security, 1st Edition, March 2004, http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/CSG-small-business.pdf
- IUP System Administrator Security Guidelines and Best Practices, <http://www.iup.edu/tsc/security/>;
- Security Engineering Awareness for Systems Engineers , <http://www.software.org/pub/externalpapers/SecEngAwareness.doc>

This task can be performed fairly quickly by logging in twice and running

```
rpm -qa | sort | less
```

in one shell, and then using the other shell to remove the packages.

Some packages are dependent upon others and the system administrator will have to remove several packages at once. In some cases, an unused package will be required by another useful package, and it will have to remain installed – for example, dateconfig relies upon audiofile (for RHEL 2,1).

If the features of dateconfig are required, then audiofile will have to remain. One may think that the functionality of dateconfig is not necessary, however, the Red Hat Enterprise Linux documentation uses this tool to adjust the date, timezone and NTP settings of the server, and some Enterprises will have problems making system changes to servers without using the vendor-recommended tools.

For services which are disabled, the relevant software should be removed for the following reasons:

1. Less software to maintain and monitor for security issues
2. The service cannot be inadvertently enabled by an errant administrator or miscreant

3. Minimize damage in an attack should the attacker gain (or already have) access to the server
4. Achieve a smaller attack surface from which to rebuff attacks

Removed software can always be reinstalled using the Enterprise procedures.

By using this methodology on a test server, a still functional basic server was produced with less than 230 packages installed (down from the original 350 packages) taking up under 350MB of disk storage. This was performed in under an hour. Further, can be stabilized in an automated way via anaconda/kickstart.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

How much unused software was installed on your system?

Scoring Status: Not Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.7 Install and Configure sudo

Description:

sudo is a package that allows the System Administrator to delegate activities to groups of users. These activities are normally beyond the administrative capability of that user – restarting the web server, for example. If frequent web server configuration changes are taking place (or the system has a bug and the web server keeps crashing), it becomes very cumbersome to continually engage the SysAdmin just to restart the web server. sudo allows the Administrator to delegate just that one task which relies upon root authority without allowing that group of users any other root capability.

Once sudo is installed, configure it using visudo – do not vi the config file. visudo has error checking built in specific to the sudo configuration. Experience has shown that if /etc/sudoers gets botched (from using vi without visudo's error checking feature), recovery may become very difficult.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Using the local Enterprise process, install sudo., then configure it as follows:

```
# The /etc/sudoers file contains one line that can be uncommented out to suitably
# permit SysAdmins with membership in the wheel group (i.e. the same ones who
# 'could' su to root) to utilize 'sudo' instead. Note: file consists of TABs
# between fields. 'visudo' IS the proper command to manually change this file,
# yet the change below passes muster when visudo is next executed.
echo "Implementing permissions for members of the wheel group to utilize sudo;"
echo "This prevents any user from having to 'su' to root for common"
echo "administrative tasks. Ideally now the root password would be changed to
echo "something very few would know (hint!)."
sed 's/# %wheel ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL/%wheel ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL/' \
```

```
/etc/sudoers-preCIS > /etc/sudoers
chown root:root /etc/sudoers
chmod 0440 /etc/sudoers
echo "diff /etc/sudoers-preCIS /etc/sudoers"
diff /etc/sudoers-preCIS /etc/sudoers
```

```
echo "More specifically, system owners are strongly encouraged to more tightly"
echo "restrict who can utilize sudo on a name by name basis (explicitly) as well"
echo "as further restrict what commands those SysAdmins are limited to using."
echo "Align this with least-privilege."
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.8 Lockout Accounts After 3 Failures

Description:

A system policy of locking out an account that fails several successive authentication attempts is an industry best practice, and is easily implemented in this Benchmark. The below value (deny=3) will cause the account to be locked out after 3 successive failed login attempts. This value is chosen as it is a common value used in some Federally-regulated industries – it can be increased, if that is desired.

Note: The below command assumes account lockouts are not already implemented on the system. If they are already implemented, edit `/etc/pam.d/system-auth` manually.

To unlock a user that has been locked out, use the `faillog` command. For example, to unlock user `oracle`, issue this command:

```
faillog -u oracle -r
```

See also the discussion at <http://www.puschitz.com/SecuringLinux.shtml>

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
# Part 1 (addresses DISA SRR GEN000560) removing entries for 'nullok'
# The removal affects the 'auth' and 'password' service types in that file.
cd /etc/pam.d
sed 's/ nullok//' /etc/pam.d-preCIS/system-auth > system-auth
# Part 2 (addresses DISA SRR GEN000800)
# Adding this option to the service type 'password' line, for 'pam_unix'.
/bin/cp -pf system-auth /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp
awk '( $1 == "password" && $3 == "pam_unix.so" ) { print $0 " remember=5"; next };
      { print }' \
      /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp > system-auth
# Part 3 (addresses CIS Benchmark SN.8, and DISA SRR GEN000460)
# Must be set AFTER the above fix, as it needs to be done first.
# In the official PAM documentation, "deny=n; Deny access if tally for this user
# EXCEEDS n". Where 'n' equals the number of attempts permitted.
# Set deny=2, as opposed to what the Benchmark recommends of '3'.
# Setting it to '3' will allow a 4th login attempt after 3 failed ones.
```

```
# Setting it to '2' will permit a total of 3 attempts.
# Also, DISA's STIG, Checklist and SRR all incorrectly expect 'deny' to equal '3'.
# Table of meaning (positively tested in practice for proof):
# "deny=1" means 2 local attempts before lockout, but only 1 from SSH {remotely}
# "deny=2" means 3 local attempts before lockout, but only 2 from SSH {remotely}
# "deny=3" means 4 local attempts before lockout, but only 3 from SSH {remotely}
# "deny=4" means 5 local attempts before lockout, but only 4 from SSH {remotely}

# These two extra lines were properly integrated 'into' the standard PAM stacks,
# vice just being added to the end of the file.
/bin/cp -pf system-auth /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp
awk '( $1 == "auth" && $2 == "required" && $3 == "pam_deny.so" ) { \
    print "# The following line added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux \
        Benchmark sec SN.8, to harden the baseline image:"; \
    print "auth        required        pam_tally2.so onerr=fail \
        no_magic_root"; print $0; next }; \
( $1 == "account" && $2 == "required" && $3 == "pam_permit.so" ) \
{ print "# The following line added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise \
    Linux Benchmark sec SN.8, to harden the baseline image:"; \
    print "account    required        pam_tally2.so deny=2 \
        no_magic_root reset"; print $0; next }; \
{ print }' /tmp/cis/system-auth.tmp > system-auth
chown root:root system-auth
chmod 0644      system-auth
echo "diff /etc/pam.d-preCIS/system-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth"
      diff /etc/pam.d-preCIS/system-auth /etc/pam.d/system-auth
cd $cishome
chmod -R 0400 /tmp/cis/*
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.9 Additional Network Parameter Tunings

Description:

Before implementing these changes, please review them with the local environment in mind. The below value for `tcp_max_orphans` is much lower than the default 16,384, and may be too low, depending on the server's use and environment.

Also be aware that logging all `tcp_max_orphans` may generate an excessive amount of audit log data, especially on multi-homed servers with at least one network interface on a hostile network (i.e., the border firewalls). You should ensure you have plenty of log space available as well as sending the logs to a remote logging host.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

```
cat <<END_SCRIPT >> /etc/sysctl.conf
# The following 02 lines added, per CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Benchmark sec
SN.9, to harden the baseline image:
net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans = 256
```

```
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root /etc/sysctl.conf
chmod 0600 /etc/sysctl.conf
echo "diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf"
diff /etc/sysctl.conf-preCIS /etc/sysctl.conf
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.10 Remove All Compilers and Assemblers

Description:

C compilers, and others, pose a credible high-risk threat to production systems and should not be installed. Compilers should be installed on select development systems – those systems that have a legitimate business need for a compiler – and the resulting output binaries deployed onto other development and production systems using the existing Enterprise change processes.

Note: Some failed dependencies may result when removing compilers and assemblers. Remove `gcc`'s dependencies first before removing `gcc`.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

Question:

Is there a mission-critical reason to have a compiler or assembler on this machine?

If the answer is no, perform the action below.

The following command will identify the packages installed on the system:

```
rpm -qa | egrep "^gcc|java|bin86|dev86|nasm|as"
```

Remove the following packages (`gcc`, `gcc3`, `gcc3-c++`, `gcc3-g77`, `gcc3-java`, `gcc3-objc`, `gcc-c++`, `gcc-chill`, `gcc-g77`, `gcc-java`, `gcc-objc`, `bin86`, `dev86`, `nasm` and `as`), if they exist on the system, with this commands:

```
rpm -e gcc gcc3 gcc3-c++ gcc3-g77 gcc3-java gcc3-objc gcc-c++ gcc-chill gcc-g77
rpm -e gcc-java gcc-objc bin86 dev86 nasm as
```

If the answer is yes, then carefully evaluate why this system is a mission-critical, as the inclusion of compilers and the risks to a mission critical system are contradictory.

Packages can be removed by:

```
rpm -e <package name>
```

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

SN.11 Verify That No Unauthorized/Duplicate UID 0 Accounts Exists

Description:

Any account with UID 0 has superuser privileges on the system. The preferred and best practice for administrators obtaining superuser privileges, is to login with an unprivileged account in the wheel group, and then use `sudo` for the operations that require `root` level access. The `sudo` software is typically installed by default with Red Hat Enterprise Linux distributions; for details see the `sudo(8)`, `sudoers(5)` and `visudo(8)` `man` pages or <http://www.sudo.ws>

Given that `sudo` is industry-accepted best practice, there is still the recognized occasional need for direct administrative console access as provided for in item 8.7 "Restrict Root Logins To System Console". For these situations, having multiple uid 0 accounts may be used by experienced administrators to provide individually assigned superuser passwords to eliminate or reduce usage of a shared `root` password, and to increase accountability. However some tools and situations do not always handle multiple uid 0 accounts as expected or desired, therefore testing is required. Specifically when booting to single user mode Item 8.9 "Require Authentication For Single-User Mode" the system will prompt for the "root" password, and none of the other uid 0 passwords will work. Also most of the GUI X-windows administration tools, if run by a non-privileged user, will prompt for the "`root`" password. There may be other applications or tools that behave unexpectedly, so testing is required.

Audit: TBD

Remediation:

The commands:

```
echo "The only single authorized entry is 'root'; any other entries here, (or"
echo "duplicates of root) must either be removed, or documented by the ISSO in the"
echo "SSP:"
echo "The second set of lines searches for inappropriate GID 0 groups. Again,"
echo "a single listing of root is the only acceptable output."
echo "-----"
awk -F: '$3 == "0" { print $1 }' /etc/passwd
echo "-----"
awk -F: '$3 == "0" { print $1 }' /etc/group
echo "-----"
```

should return only the word "root", unless additional uid 0 accounts have been specifically authorized. Having multiple uid 0 accounts are acceptable if the accounts are authorized, but not recommended for some situations; see the discussion for more detail.

Audit: TBD

Scoring Status: Scorable

Compliance Mapping: TBD

Additional References: TBD

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Appendix B: File Backup Script

```
#!/bin/bash
cishome="/root/cis"
echo "Creating $cishome/do-restore.sh"
cat <<END_SCRIPT > $cishome/do-restore.sh
#!/bin/bash

# This script restores those files changed by hardening IAW the CISecurity
Benchmark
# Built by the RHEL Linux Benchmark do-backup.sh script.
# Errors for unalias get sent to the console when not 'set'
unalias rm mv cp 2> /dev/null

/usr/bin/chattr -i /etc/fstab /boot/grub/menu.lst /boot/grub/grub.conf
sed -n "39,9999p" $cishome/do-restore.sh | while read LINE; do
#
#### When a file didn't exist before doing the back up
#### then the REPAIR should ensure the existing one is removed.
#
FILE=`echo $LINE | awk '{print $1}'`
PERMS=`echo $LINE | awk '{print $2}'`
echo "Restoring $FILE with $PERMS permissions"
[ -f $FILE-preCIS ] && /bin/cp -pf $FILE-preCIS $FILE
/bin/chmod $PERMS $FILE
[ -f $FILE-preCIS ] && /bin/rm $FILE-preCIS
done

echo "Completed file restoration - restoring directories"
# Manually sorted the CIS file/dir list alphabetically, removed duplicates, and
corrected
# spacing to ease the finding/adding of new ones.
for DIR in \
/etc/cron.* \
/etc/pam.d \
/etc/rc.d \
/etc/skel \
/etc/xinetd.d \
/var/spool/cron;
do
if [ -d $DIR-preCIS ]; then
echo "Restoring $DIR"
/bin/cp -pr $DIR-preCIS $DIR
/bin/rm -rf $DIR-preCIS
fi
done

echo "If you installed Bastille, please run "
echo "'/usr/sbin/RevertBastille'; and examine its list of changed files as well."
exit 0

### END OF SCRIPT. DYNAMIC DATA FOLLOWS. ###
END_SCRIPT
chown root:root $cishome/do-restore.sh
chmod 0700 $cishome/do-restore.sh
echo " "

echo "Performing a modified 'do-backup.sh' (taken from the CIS v1.0.6 Benchmark)."
```

```
# Manually sorted the CIS file/dir list alphabetically, removed duplicates, and
corrected
#      spacing to ease the finding/adding of new ones.
# Files that don't natively exist in a virgin RHEL5 system:
# /etc/at.allow
# /etc/audit.rules
# /etc/auditd.conf
# /etc/cron.allow
# /etc/ftpaccess
# /etc/ftplib
# /etc/vsftpd.conf
# /etc/vsftpd.ftplib
# /etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf
# /etc/X11/xdm/Xservers
# /etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf
# /etc/X11/gdm/PreSession/Default
# /etc/X11/xinit/xserverrc
# /etc/X11/xdm/Xresources
# /etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc
# /etc/xinetd.conf
# /var/spool/cron

for FILE in \
/boot/grub/grub.conf \
/etc/aliases \
/etc/at.allow \
/etc/at.deny \
/etc/audit.rules \
/etc/auditd.conf \
/etc/audit/audit.rules \
/etc/audit/auditd.conf \
/etc/bashrc \
/etc/cron.allow \
/etc/cron.deny \
/etc/crontab \
/etc/csh.cshrc \
/etc/csh.login \
/etc/cups/cupsd.conf \
/etc/exports \
/etc/fstab \
/etc/ftpaccess \
/etc/ftplib \
/etc/group \
/etc/grub.conf \
/etc/gshadow \
/etc/hosts.allow \
/etc/hosts.deny \
/etc/inittab \
/etc/issue \
/etc/issue.net \
/etc/login.defs \
/etc/mail/sendmail.cf \
/etc/motd \
/etc/pam.d/su \
/etc/pam.d/system-auth \
/etc/passwd \
/etc/profile \
/etc/proftpd.conf \
/etc/securetty \
```

```

/etc/security/access.conf \
/etc/security/console.perms \
/etc/security/console.perms.d/50-default.perms \
/etc/security/limits.conf \
/etc/shadow \
/etc/skel/.bashrc \
/etc/ssh/ssh_config \
/etc/ssh/sshd_config \
/etc/sudoers \
/etc/sysconfig/sendmail \
/etc/sysctl.conf \
/etc/syslog.conf \
/etc/vsftpd.conf \
/etc/vsftpd.ftpusers \
/etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf \
/etc/X11/xdm/Xservers \
/etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf \
/etc/X11/gdm/PreSession/Default \
/etc/X11/xinit/xserverrc \
/etc/X11/xdm/Xresources \
/etc/X11/xdm/kdmrc \
/etc/xinetd.conf \
/root/.bash_profile \
/root/.bashrc \
/root/.cshrc \
/root/.tcshrc \
/usr/share/config/kdm/Xservers \
/var/spool/cron;
do
    if [ -f ${FILE} ]; then
        # Backup files that exist (some might not)
        echo "Protected: `ls -lad ${FILE}`" >> $cishome/do-
restore.savelog
        /bin/cp -pf ${FILE} ${FILE}-preCIS
        # Add it to the do-restore script
        echo ${FILE} `find ${FILE} -printf "%m"` >> $cishome/do-
restore.sh
    else
        # This helps to compare various OS updates for correctness.
        echo "FILE didnt exist on this system (${FILE})." | tee -a $cishome/do-
restore.savelog
    fi
done

echo "Completed CIS file backups - backing up applicable directories"

# Manually sorted the CIS-provided file/dir list alphabetically, removed
duplicates, and corrected
# spacing to ease the finding/adding/organization of new ones.
for DIR in \
/etc/cron.* \
/etc/pam.d \
/etc/rc.d \
/etc/skel \
/etc/xinetd.d \
/var/spool/cron;
do
    # echo ${DIR}
    [ -d ${DIR} ] && /bin/cp -pr ${DIR} ${DIR}-preCIS

```

```
done
```

```
echo "Completed CIS RHEL Benchmark directory backups."
```

```
echo "(CIS) Recording log permissions"
```

```
find /var/log -printf "%h/%f %m\n" >> $cishome/do-restore.sh
```

```
echo "CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux Backup protections are complete---`date`"
```

```
echo ""
```

Appendix C: Change History

April 2008 - Version 1.1

- Removed erroneous/confusing change history entries.

February 2008 - Version 1.0

- Public Release

Appendix D: References

The Center for Internet Security

Free Benchmark documents and security tools for various OS platforms and applications:

<http://www.cisecurity.org>

Red Hat Software

Patches and related documentation:

<https://www.redhat.com/security>

Red Hat Update Manager tools:

yum:

<https://rhn.redhat.com/help/latest-up2date.pxt>

<https://rhn.redhat.com>

yum: <http://www.linuxgazette.com/node/view/8835>

HAL:

<http://www.redhat.com/magazine/003jan05/features/hal>

Other Misc Documentation

Various documentation on Linux security issues:

<https://www.redhat.com/security>

Primary source for information on NTP:

<http://www.ntp.org>

Information on MIT Kerberos:

<http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www>

Apache "Security Tips" document:

http://httpd.apache.org/docs-2.0/misc/security_tips.html

Information on Sendmail and DNS:

<http://www.sendmail.org>

<http://www.deer-run.com/~hal/dns-sendmail/DNSandSendmail.pdf>

OpenSSH (secure encrypted network logins):

<http://www.openssh.org>

TCP Wrappers source distribution:

<ftp://porcupine.org>

PortSentry and Logcheck (port and log monitoring tools):

<http://sourceforge.net/projects/sentrytools>

Swatch (log monitoring tool):

<http://www.oit.ucsb.edu/~eta/swatch>

Open Source Sendmail (email server) distributions:

<ftp://ftp.sendmail.org>

LPRng (Open Source replacement printing system for Unix):

<http://www.lprng.org>

sudo (provides fine-grained access controls for superuser activity):

<http://www.courtesan.com/sudo>

Tripwire – file modification utility:

<http://www.tripwire.org>

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G	NSA, <u>Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, Rev 1</u> , System and Network Analysis Center, National Security Agency, Dec 13, 2007
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J	National Security Agency/Central Security Service, <u>Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF) v3.1</u> , Sep 2002
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